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I. INTRODUCTION

Article III of the Constitution describes the judicial power of the
United States as extending to "cases" and "controversies." 1 The plain
meaning of these words, however, offers little insight into what the
Framers intended should be the proper scope of the federal judicial
power. 2 To discern the Framers' intent, the Supreme Court has looked to
common understandings about what activities are appropriately resolved
through the judicial process. Based upon those understandings, the
Court has developed a set of rules-standing, mootness, and ripeness,
among others-through which it defines the limits of the Judiciary's
power in relation to the powers of the coordinate branches of
government. 4
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1.U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) ("Article III of
the Constitution confines the federal courts to adjudicating actual 'cases' and 'controversies."').
2. As the Supreme Court has noted, an executive inquiry may be called a "case" and a legislative dispute may be called a "controversy." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559
(1992). However, despite these labels, neither an executive inquiry nor a legislative dispute would be
"appropriately resolved through the judicial process." See id. at 559-60.
3. Id.
4. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 750.
[T]he 'case or controversy' requirement defines with respect to the Judicial Branch the
idea of separation of powers on which the Federal Government is founded. The several
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It is important to limit the Judiciary because its power is uniquely
susceptible to abuse: the Judiciary is the only branch of government that
is not elected and the only branch that can define the limits of its own
power. 5 Therefore, it is critical that the Judiciary applies its own rules of
limitation fairly and consistently. Otherwise, if the Judiciary inconsistently interprets its own rules or capriciously expands its power, it imperils not only its own integrity, but one of the Constitutional foundations of
our government: separation of powers.
The law of standing, which is one dimension of the case-andcontroversy requirement, addresses the important question of whether a
party who brings a claim in federal court is a proper party to invoke
federal court jurisdiction.6 To have standing to litigate a cause of action
under modern standing doctrine, a party must allege that he or she has
actually suffered or will imminently suffer a concrete and particular
injury caused by the defendant.7 Nothing less will satisfy the Constitution. 8 The alleged injury must be actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical. 9
Requiring plaintiffs to allege an injury serves two primary concerns. First, it frames the legal question sought to be adjudicated in a factual context within which a court is capable of making decisions. 10

doctrines that have grown up to elaborate that requirement are "founded in concern about
the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society."
1d. (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)).
5. See Walter Berns, The Least Dangerous Branch, But Only if..., in THE JUDICIARY IN A
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 1 (Leonard J. Theberge, ed., 1979).

[T]he judicial power of the United States is described in the Constitution, but it is the
Court that defines it, from which it follows that the judicial power is whatever the Court
makes of it. And if it is whatever the Court makes of it, it cannot be used. This is an argument that has to be met... for if the judicial power cannot be abused, it cannot be
properly used.
Id.
6. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968).
7. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. See also infra notes 280-84 and accompanying text.
8. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.

9. Id. "Although imminence is concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be stretched
beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III
purposes-that the injury is certainly impending." Id. at 564 n.2 (citation, quotation marks, and
emphasis omitted).
10. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220-21 (1974); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472
(1982).
The requirement of actual injury redressable by the court serves several of the implicit
policies embodied in Article IIl. It tends to assure that the legal questions presented to the

court will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial
action.
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Unlike the Legislative Branch, the Judiciary does not have the ability to
call hearings, make reports, conduct investigations, or otherwise make an
exploratory record." Rather, the courts completely depend on the parties
in each case to present the relevant facts and the claims sought to be adjudicated.1 2 Second, the concrete injury requirement insures the framing
of relief no broader than required by the precise facts, which is especially
important when adjudication would produce a confrontation with one of
the coordinate branches of government. 13 Thus, the concrete injury requirement serves to prevent the Judiciary from invading the province of
the other branches of government unless necessary under the particular
circumstances of a case. 14 These dual concerns, i.e., the limited competency of the Judiciary and the idea of separation of powers, provide
strong justifications for the concrete injury requirement in standing law.
The two Constitutional concerns just outlined-the limited competency of the Judiciary and separation of powers-strongly justify requiring all parties to allege a concrete injury in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Despite this strong Constitutional justification,
the courts have carved out an exception to the concrete injury requirement when the plaintiff is a taxpayer challenging congressional spending.
The resulting doctrine of taxpayer standing is at odds with the demands
made and Constitutional protections otherwise afforded by standing
doctrine. 15
Generally speaking, taxpayers have no standing because a taxpayer's grievance about the government's allocation of its largesse is
generally abstract and ideological in nature. 16 In such a case, the taxpayer
does not suffer from the actual or imminent concrete injury that is so essential to the Judiciary's ability to render legal decisions.

Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). See also discussion infra Part VI.B.
11. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 221 n.10. See also discussion infra Part VII.
12. Schlesinger,418 U.S. at 221.
13. Id. at 222.
14. As summarized in Schlesinger, "[t]o permit a complainant who has no concrete injury to
require a court to rule on important constitutional issues in the abstract would ... distort the role of
the Judiciary in its relationship to the Executive and the Legislature." Id. (quotation marks omitted).
15. According to Justice Powell,
All standing cases, even the most recent ones, include references to the need for particularized injury or similar language. None of them as yet has equated the interest of a taxpayer or citizen, suing in that status alone, with the particularized interest that standing
doctrine has traditionally demanded. To take that step, it appears to me, would render the
requirement of direct or immediate injury meaningless and would reduce the Court's consistent insistence on such an injury to mere talk.
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 194 n.16 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
16. See infra notes 300-03 and accompanying text.
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It makes sense, therefore, that for most of the twentieth century,
taxpayers had no special standing.1 7 The Supreme Court considered but
rejected a special taxpayer standing doctrine in the famous 1923 case of
Frothinghamv. Mellon.1 8 In that case, the Court held that the federal Judiciary is not a proper forum for taxpayers to air their general grievances
concerning the government's allocation of federal tax dollars.1 9 As that
holding implies, the representative branches
of government are better
20
suited to respond to taxpayer grievances.
However, in Flast v. Cohen, decided in 1968, the Court reversed
over four decades of standing jurisprudence and for the first time backpedaled from its original position and created a separate standing doctrine for certain taxpayer suits. 21 In Flast, the Supreme Court held that
the federal Judiciary is a proper forum for taxpayers challenging congressional spending alleged to violate the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment. The Court based its decision on a standing paradigm
that depends on the substantive issues in a case, rather than the injury to
the particular complainant. 22 By adopting this paradigm, the Court ignored not only the carefully circumscribed role of the Judiciary in our
federal system of government, but also the Judiciary's core competency
within that system. 23 Moreover, because the Constitution absolutely requires that plaintiffs allege a concrete injury, and because the Flast Court
held that taxpayers who could not meet that requirement nonetheless had
standing, that decision cast a shadow on the legitimacy of the Judiciary.24
To be sure, the Supreme Court has since applied the Flast standing
model only in a narrow class of cases. 25 Specifically, the Court has said
that the federal courts are proper forums for taxpayer grievances only
when the taxpayer demonstrates a "nexus between the taxpayer's stand-

17. See discussion infra Part II.A-C.
18. 262 U.S. 447 (1923). See also discussion infra Part II.A.

19. Id.at488-89.
20. See discussion infra Part VII.
21. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). See also discussion infra Part II.C.
22. Flast, 392 U.S. at 105-06.
23. See discussion infra Part VI.A.
24. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982).

[R]epeated and essentially head-on confrontations between the life-tenured branch and
the representative branches of government will not, in the long run, be beneficial to either. The public confidence essential to the former and the vitality critical to the latter
may well erode if we do not exercise self-restraint in the utilization of our power to negative the actions of the other branches.
Id. (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (Powell, J., concurring)).
25. See, e.g., Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the
War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); Valley Forge, 454 U.S. 464; Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
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ing as a taxpayer and the congressional exercise of taxing and spending
power.' 26 However, this nexus requirement, even when stringently applied, does not provide any sort of sensible
measurement of the extent, if
27
any, of a taxpayer's concrete injury.
Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit again propelled the issue of taxpayer standing into the forefront of federal jurisprudence, paving a doctrinal crossroads of sorts for the Supreme Court.28
In Freedomfrom Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Chao (hereinafter Freedom), the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff taxpayers had standing to
challenge the constitutionality of the Executive Branch's dedication of
29
federal funds to the Faith Based and Community Initiatives program.
The plaintiffs claimed that this use of federal monies to the program
violated the Establishment Clause.3 °
In holding that the plaintiffs had standing, the Freedom court
broadened the Flast standing model to encompass a new class of taxpayer cases. Previously, taxpayers had standing only when they challenged a particular appropriation statute on the grounds that Congress's
taxing and spending power was restricted in that case by a specific
Constitutional provision. 3 1 The Freedom standing model, however, recognizes the standing of taxpayers who allege that virtually any executive
program violates the Establishment Clause.32
Authored by Judge Posner, the watershed majority opinion in Freedom spawned a strong dissenting opinion from Judge Ripple. 33 As characterized by Judge Ripple, the majority opinion reflects an overconfident
view about the nature of Article III judicial power.34 Judge Ripple's dissent was joined by three more judges when the defendants' petition for
rehearing was denied.35 In addition, Chief Judge Flaum and Judge
Easterbrook concurred in the denial of rehearing, but only because they

26. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 620 (emphasis added); see also Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 228 (denying
taxpayer standing because "respondents did not challenge an enactment under [Article 1, Section 8],
but rather the action of the Executive Branch in permitting Members of Congress to maintain their
Reserve status").
27. See discussion infra Part VI.C.
28. See discussion infra Part lII.
29. 433 F.3d 989, 996-97 (7th Cir. 2006).
30. Id. at 993-94.
31. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105-06 (1968).
32. See Freedom, 433 F.3d at 996-97.
33. Id at 997-1001 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
34. See id. at 997.
35. Judge Ripple was joined by Judges Manion, Kanne, and Sykes. Freedom from Religion
Found., Inc. v. Chao, 447 F.3d 988 (7th Cir. 2006).

656

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 30:651

thought the matter should be resolved by the Supreme Court. 36 Apparently the Court agreed with this assessment because on December 1,
2006, the37 Court granted certiorari review, and the case is presently
pending.
This Article calls upon the Supreme Court to stay the Judiciary's
hand in taxpayer grievances concerning purely executive action. Parts II
and III of the Article provide the relevant background material for an
understanding of the subject matter. Specifically, Part I recounts the
evolution of taxpayer standing, taking the reader from the Supreme
Court's decision in Frothingham to its counterpoint decision in Flast.
Part III summarizes the Seventh Circuit's unprecedented decision in
Freedom.38 Part IV demonstrates that taxpayer standing as conceived by
the Freedom court does not conform to the standing paradigm formulated
in Flast, and moreover, directly conflicts with the holdings of seminal
post-FlastSupreme Court cases.
Parts V and VI posit that even assuming arguendo that Freedom
does not directly conflict with Supreme Court precedent, the decision
should not be affirmed for two other reasons. First, as discussed in Part
V, the Freedom court's conception of taxpayer standing should not be
sustained because there is no logical nexus between taxpayer status and a
claim challenging executive action that violates the Establishment
Clause. Second, as discussed in Part VI, the Freedom court's expansion
of taxpayer standing cannot be reconciled with modem standing doctrine
and the requirement of a concrete injury. Part VII proposes that through
general oversight authority and the power of the purse, the Legislative
Branch is more competent to address and remedy taxpayer grievances
challenging executive spending abuses. In the concluding remarks, the
Article provides the Supreme Court with a roadmap to follow in charting
its course through the doctrinal crossroads paved by the Freedom court.

36. Id. at 988 (Flaum, J., concurring) ("[M]y vote to deny the petition for rehearing en banc is
not premised upon a conclusion that the taxpayer standing issue... is free from doubt.... However,
the obvious tension which has evolved in this area ofjurisprudence... can only be resolved by the
Supreme Court."); id. at 989 (Easterbrook, J., concurring) ("The problem is not of our creation and
cannot be resolved locally."). The defendants filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court on August 1, 2006.
37. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S.Ct. 722 (2006).
38. Part III of this Article identifies three "conditions" upon which the Freedom court rested its
standing decision. Those conditions help to frame the standing discussion in the rest of the Article.
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF TAXPAYER STANDING
DOCTRINE: FROM FROTHINGHAMTO FLAST

Early in the twentieth century, a plaintiffs status as a federal taxpayer was never a proper basis to invoke federal court jurisdiction; by the
late twentieth century, taxpayer status had evolved into a viable basis in a
narrow set of cases. As early as 1923, in the case of Frothinghamv. Mellon, the Supreme Court held in broad terms that a federal court is not a
proper forum for taxpayers to air their general grievances concerning
Congress's appropriation of federal tax dollars.39 It was not until 1968, in
Flast v. Cohen, that the Court opened the federal courthouse doors to a
very narrow set of taxpayers, namely, those challenging congressional
spending programs on Establishment Clause grounds. 40 This Part explicates the Frothingham and Flast decisions in detail, with particular
emphasis on the narrowness of the Flast decision, and provides some
historical background helpful to an understanding of those decisions.
A. Frothingham v. Mellon: The GeneralRule Against Taxpayer Standing
In Frothingham, the plaintiff brought suit against the Secretary of
Treasury and others, challenging the constitutionality of the Maternity
Act of 1921 .4 1 The Maternity Act provided financial grants to states participating in programs aimed at reducing maternal and infant mortality
and improving maternal and infant health. 42 The plaintiff, a federal taxpayer, sought to enjoin execution of that appropriation act.43 Mrs. Frothingham alleged that execution of the Maternity Act would "increase the
burden of future taxation and take 44her property, under the guise of
taxation, without due process of law.
The initial question before the Frothingham Court was standing.
The Court posed the question of whether "a taxpayer [may maintain an
action in federal court] to enjoin the execution of a federal appropriation
act, on the ground that it is invalid and will result in taxation for illegal
purposes., 45 In a well-reasoned opinion authored by Justice Sutherland,
the Court held that a federal taxpayer does not have standing to seek to

39. 262 U.S. 447, 488-89 (1923).
40.392 U.S. 83, 105-06 (1968).

41. 262 U.S. at 479.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 486.
44. Id. at 480, 486. She also alleged that the Maternity Act was an attempt by Congress to
exercise the power of local government reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 479.
45. Id. at 486.
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enjoin execution of a federal appropriation act. 46 In arriving at this conclusion, the Court employed two distinct lines of reasoning.4 7
In the first line of reasoning, the Frothingham Court focused on the
attenuated relationship between a single federal taxpayer and the federal
government. The Court observed that a taxpayer's interest in the moneys
of the treasury, which is shared with millions of others, is "minute and
indeterminable., 48 Similarly, the Court commented that the effect upon
future taxation of any single payment out of the treasury is "remote, fluctuating and uncertain., 49 Because a taxpayer's interest in the moneys of
the federal treasury was indirect and remote, the Court opined that the
remedy of injunction to prevent their misuse was inappropriate. 50 The
Court stated that "no basis [was]
afforded for an appeal to the preventive
51
powers of a court of equity."
In connection with its discussion of the relation of a taxpayer to the
federal government, the Court commented that the administration of a
federal appropriation statute was "essentially a matter of public and not
of individual concern." 52 The FrothinghamCourt was concerned that if it
recognized standing in that case, the floodgates would open to two types
of taxpayer cases. 53 First, if one taxpayer could challenge an appropriation statute, then every other taxpayer could do the same.54 Second, if an
appropriation statute could be challenged, then every other statute whose
administration requires an outlay of public money could also be challenged. 55 The Court noted that the potential for such a result "sustained

46. Id. at 487.
47. See id at 480, 486-89. The Frothinghtam Court dismissed the complaint because "[t]he
appellant... [had no] interest in the subject-matter, nor [was any] injury inflicted or threatened, as
[would] enable her to sue." Id. at 480.
48. Id. at 487.
49. Id.As noted in Frothingham, the interest of a municipal taxpayer in municipal funds is
"direct and immediate," similar to the interest of a stockholder of a private corporation. Id.at 486-87
(citing Roberts v. Bradfield, 175 U.S. 291, 295 (1899); Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U.S. 601, 609

(1880)). For that reason, federal courts have generally taken a relaxed approach to the standing of
municipal taxpayers challenging local government spending projects. See Nancy C. Staudt, Taxpayers in Court: A Systematic Study of a (Misunderstood)Standing Doctrine, 52 EMORY L.J. 771, 835

(2003) (finding based upon an empirical study of taxpayer standing in federal courts that "many
federal judges are friendly, if not outright solicitous, to state and municipal taxpayers challenging
local government spending projects."). The matter of municipal taxpayer standing is beyond the
scope of this Article.
50. Frothingham,262 U.S. at 487.

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 487-88.
Id.
Id.

2007]

Taxpayer Grievances and Executive Action

the conclusion which [it] reached, ' 56 but the opinion did not suggest that
its conclusion was based on the "floodgates" problem.
In the second line of reasoning, the Frothingham Court indicated
that it did not possess the power to adjudicate the taxpayer suit because
the plaintiff had not alleged a "direct injury" so as to warrant invasion of
the province of the Legislative Branch. 57 Reflecting upon the nature of
our tripartite system of government,58 the Court opined that the Judiciary
cannot review a congressional act unless "some direct injury suffered or
threatened, presenting a justiciable issue, is made to rest upon such an
act.",59 To invoke the federal judicial power, a litigant cannot rest on the
mere assertion that he or she "suffers in some indefinite way in common
with people generally. '60 Because the plaintiff had not alleged a direct
injury sustained as a result of enforcement of the Maternity6 Act, the
Court concluded the case did not present a judicial controversy. 1
Although the word standing does not appear in the Frothingham
opinion, 62 the case is commonly regarded as a standing decision, if not

56. Id.
57. Id. at 488. As discussed in Part VI.B., the principle of separation of powers is now recognized as the "single basic idea" underlying modem Article III standing doctrine. See Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984).
58. Frothingham,262 U.S. at 488.
The functions of government under our system are apportioned. To the legislative department has been committed the duty of making laws, to the executive the duty of executing them, and to the judiciary the duty of interpreting and applying them in cases
properly brought before the courts. The general rule is that neither department may invade the province of the other and neither may control, direct, or restrain the action of the
other.
Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id at 488-89 ("To do so would be, not to decide a judicial controversy, but to assume a
position of authority over the governmental acts of another and coequal department, an authority
which plainly we do not possess.").
62. The concept of standing as an Article III limitation on a federal court's power first appears
in Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 464-68 (1939). See
Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV.
1371, 1378 (1988). The same concept appears later in the Supreme Court's majority opinion in Stark
v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 302 (1944). See James Leonard & Joanne C. Brant, The Half-Open Door:
Article III, the Injury-In-FactRule, and the Framers' Plan for Federal Courts on Limited Jurisdiction, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 7 (2001). In Stark, the Court stated:
It is only when a complainant possesses something more than a general interest in the
proper execution of the laws that he is in a position to secure judicial intervention. His interest must rise to the dignity of an interest personal to him and not possessed by the people generally. Such a claim is of that character which constitutionally permits adjudication by courts under their general powers.
321 U.S. at 304 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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the origin of the standing doctrine itself. 63 Indeed, it is now wellestablished that Frothingham stands for the general proposition that a
federal taxpayer does not have standing to invoke the power of the federal Judiciary to challenge the constitutionality of a federal appropriation
statute.64
As discussed above, the Frothingham Court's decision to dismiss
the taxpayer suit rested on two distinct concerns: (1) the attenuated relationship between a single federal taxpayer and the monies in the federal
treasury, and (2) the lack of a direct injury that would warrant invasion of
the province of another branch of government. 65 Due to the dualistic nature of the Court's rationale, many scholars and courts have debated
whether the rule established in Frothingham emanates from constitutional or prudential concerns. 6666 As noted by Justice Brennan, "the principal interpretative difficulty lies in the manner in which Frothingham
chose to blend the language of policy with seemingly absolute statements
about jurisdiction. ' '67 According to Brennan, the first line of reasoningthe attenuated relationship between a taxpayer and treasury moniesdenotes a prudential consideration, not a distinction recognized by the

63. Most scholars trace the origin of standing doctrine to Frothingham.See Richard A. Epstein,
Standing and Spending-The Role of Legal and Equitable Principles, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 1, 1 (2001)
("The rise of modem standing doctrine in American Constitutional Law can be traced with some
precision to Justice Sutherland's opinion for a unanimous Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. Mellon, and its companion case of Frothingham v. Mellon."); Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 612, 622 (2004) ("[T]he Supreme Court first devised the doctrine of standing (applicable to all plaintiffs in federal court) in Frothingham v. Mellon."). Other scholars trace the origin of
standing doctrine to Fairchildv. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126 (1922), a case in which the Supreme Court
dismissed a complaint brought by a plaintiff who, as citizen, taxpayer, and member of the American
Constitutional League, sought to challenge the process by which the Nineteenth Amendment to the
Constitution was ratified. E.g., Winter, supra note 62, at 1376. In Fairchild,Justice Brandeis, writing
for the Court, reasoned that the plaintiff did not have a sufficient interest in the matter to afford a
basis for the lawsuit. 258 U.S. at 129. Although Brandeis did not specifically address the issue of
taxpayer standing, he presaged his restrictive position on standing when he stated that "the right,
possessed by every citizen, to require that the government be administered according to law and that
the public moneys be not wasted ... does not entitle a private citizen to institute in the federal courts
a suit." Id.
64. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 85 (1968).
65. See Frothingham,262 U.S. at 487-88.
66. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 496 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Flast,392 U.S. at 92-93 & n.6 (citing
Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure JudicialReview: PrivateActions, 75 HARV. L. REV. 255, 302-303
(1961); Arthur Garfield Hays, Civil Liberties Conference: Public Aid to ParochialSchools and
Standing to Bring Suit, 12 BUFF. L. REV. 35, 48-65 (1962); Kenneth Culp Davis, Standing to Challenge GovernmentalAction, 39 MINN. L. REV. 353, 386-391 (1955)).
67. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 496 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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"
hand, the concluding sentence of the FrothOn the other
Constitution. 68Onte

ingham opinion states that to take jurisdiction of the taxpayer's suit in the
absence of an injury "would not be to decide a judicial controversy, but
to assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of another
and co-equal department, an authority which plainly we do not possess."6 9 As Brennan observed,7 ° that sentence implies a constitutional
rule.71
While the dualistic aspect of the Frothingham Court's rationale
provides some justification for this debate,72 the Court's use of jurisdiction-related words, such as "power," "judicial controversy," and "authority," denotes constitutional concerns. In that respect, the Frothingham
opinion may be best understood as establishing, at least in part, a constitutional rule. Under Frothingham, a federal taxpayer does not have
constitutional standing to challenge the constitutionality of a
congressional appropriation act because a federal taxpayer suffers no
direct injury as a result of the execution of an appropriation act.
Notwithstanding the debate surrounding the rationale, the rule in
Frothingham stood undisturbed for nearly half of a century as an "impenetrable barrier to suits against Acts of Congress brought by individuals who can assert only the interest of federal taxpayers. 73
B. The Intervening Years from Frothingham to Flast:
A Time of DoctrinalUnrest
After the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Frothingham,
standing doctrine outside the arena of taxpayer standing began to evolve.
Indeed, the fifty-year period after Frothingham proved to be a time of
doctrinal unrest, which set the stage for the Court's pivotal decision in
Flast.
In the 1930s and 1940s, the Court developed an onerous legal interest standing test. To have standing to sue in federal court, plaintiffs were
required to allege a "direct injury" caused by an act of the defendant,74

68. Id. at 497 n.8. The prevailing view of the commentators is that Frothingham intended to
announce only a non-constitutional rule of self-restraint. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 92 n.6.
69. Frothingham,262 U.S. at 488-89.
70. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 496 n.8 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
71. Flast, 392 U.S. at 92-93.
72. See id. at 93 n.7.
73. Id. at 85. See also, e.g., Home v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 344 F.2d 725, 729 (8th Cir. 1965)

(dismissing an action brought by a plaintiff, as a citizen of the United States and a federal taxpayer,
challenging the constitutionality of the National Bank Act and the Federal Reserve Act).
74. See Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 479 (1938) (citing Massachusetts v. Mellon. 262 U.S. 477, 486 (1923)).
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but "[t]he term 'direct injury' [was] used in its legal sense, as meaning a
wrong which directly results in the violation of a legal right." 75 An allegation of an injury-in-fact would not suffice. 76 Rather, the standing question asked whether a plaintiff had alleged an invasion of some legally
protected interest or legal right created by a statute, the Constitution, or
common law.77
Courts commonly answered this question with reference to the field
of law upon which a plaintiff based his or her claim, asking whether that
field of law granted the plaintiff the right to sue. 78 For example, in Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, the Court denied standing to the plaintiffs, private power companies alleging the unconstitutionality of the statutory plan that allowed the Tennessee Valley
Authority to generate and sell electricity. 79 Although the plaintiffs
claimed an injury to their competitive positions, the Court denied their
standing because they failed to allege an invasion of a "legal right--one

75. Alabama Power, 302 U.S. at 479.
76. See id."It is an ancient maxim, that a damage ...without an injury in this sense.., does
not lay the foundation of an action." Id. The Latin phrase for this maxim is damnum absque injuria.
Id.
77. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 152 (1951) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
A litigant ordinarily has standing to challenge governmental action of a sort that, if taken
by a private person, would create a right of action cognizable by the courts. Or standing
may be based on an interest created by the Constitution or a statute. But if no comparable
common-law right exists and no such constitutional or statutory interest has been created,
relief is not available judicially.
Id.(citations and footnote omitted); see also Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258, 272-73 (1924)
(Sutherland, J., dissenting).
A private injury, for which the law affords no remedy, cannot be converted into a remediable injury, merely because it results from an act of which the public might complain.
In other words, the law will afford redress to a litigant only for injuries which invade his
own legal rights; and since the injuries here complained of are not of that character, and
do not result from the violation of any obligation owing to the complainants, it follows
that they are without legal standing to sue.
Id.
78. Michael E. Rosman, Standing Alone. Standing Under The Fair Housing Act, 60 MO. L.
REV. 547, 553-54 (1995).
The critics of modem standing doctrine, for the most part, seem to agree that the "legal
interest" test had more going for it than current doctrine. In any standing case, they say,
the question should really be whether the positive law upon which the plaintiff bases his
or her claim grants that plaintiffthe right to sue.
Id; Kenneth E. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court, A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645,
650 (1973) ("By using [the legal interest] formula, the Court was in effect seeking guidance from
other fields of law on whether plaintiff's interest was sufficient to warrant judicial protection.");
Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article 111,
91
MICH. L. REV. 163, 170 (1992) ("Without a cause of action, there was no case or controversy and
hence no standing.").
79. 306 U.S. 118, 147 (1939).
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of property, one arising out of contract, one protected against8 0tortious
invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege."
In 1962, in the case of Baker v. Carr,the Court signaled dissatisfaction with the legal interest test. 81 Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan
reframed the "gist of the question of standing" as whether "the appellants
alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure [the presence of] that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions., 82 Applying that formulation, the Court considered whether the plaintiffs, a group of voters, had
standing to challenge a state legislative apportionment statute on the
ground that the statute deprived them of equal protection of the laws and
caused a dilution of their votes.83 Although "[t]he notion of dilution of
any particular vote is as abstract and indefinable as the effect on a taxpayer of a questioned action requiring a modicum of expenditure," 84 the
Court held that the voters had standing to sue under this new formulation.8 5 In so holding, the Court noted that it was not necessary to decide
whether the impairment of the plaintiffs' votes would produce a legally
cognizable injury. 86 The Court did not, however, provide any guidance as
to the meaning of the newfound concepts "personal stake" and "concrete
adverseness," thereby "le[aving] [the] courts at sea in applying the law of
87
standing.

Hence, in the mid-1960s, standing doctrine was in a state of flux
and uncertainty. In addition to the scholarly debate surrounding the rationale for the taxpayer standing decision in Frothingham,88 the Baker
Court had evinced dissatisfaction with the legal interest test and had
framed an amorphous standing test that was unproven and ill-defined. 89

80. Id.at 137; see also Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 125 (1940) (denying stand-

ing in a group of iron and steel producers alleging a loss of government contracts as a result of the
Secretary of Labor's minimum wage determination because "no legal rights of respondents were
shown to have been invaded or threatened"); Alabama Power, 302 U.S. at 479 (denying standing in
a plaintiff alleging a threatened loss of business attributable to federal loan-and-grant agreements
awarded to four municipal corporations).
81. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

82. Id. at 204.
83. Id. at 204-08.
84. Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1046 n.45 (1968).
85. Baker, 369 U.S. at 198.

86. Id. at 208.
87. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).

88. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
89. See supranotes 81-87 and accompanying text.
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Amidst this doctrinal unrest, the Court was presented with the seminal
taxpayer standing case of Flast v. Cohen,90 discussed below.
C. Flast v. Cohen: A Narrow Window for Taxpayers Suits
In Flast, the Court recognized, for the first time, the standing of
taxpayers challenging the government's allocation of federal funds. The
subset of taxpayer cases falling within Flast is narrow, however, because
the Court only slightly lowered the Frothinghambarrier. 91 As illustrated
below, the power to lower that barrier came from an unlikely source: the
might of the Establishment Clause as a specific bulwark against congressional spending abuses.
In Flast, the taxpayers claimed that the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965 (Education Act) as applied by the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare was unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause. 92 The taxpayers complained that federal funds appropriated under the Education Act were being used to finance instruction in,
and purchase materials, for religious schools.9 3 The sole issue before the
Court was standing: "whether the Frothinghambarrier should be lowered
when a taxpayer attacks a federal statute on the ground that it violates the
94
Establishment and the Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment."
The Flast Court started its analysis with a discussion of the stand9 5 But rather than resolve the doctrinal debate
ing rule in Frothingham.
surrounding that decision, the Court undertook a "fresh examination of
the limitations upon standing to sue in a federal court., 9 6 The Court
opined that the Article III limitations on standing are "related only to
whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial
resolution." 97 According to the Court, a taxpayer may maintain an action
only when the taxpayer has a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy in order to impart the necessary concrete adverseness of the litigation. 98 To make that determination, it was necessary to ascertain

90. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
91. See id.at 105-06.
92. Id. at 85, 87-88. Alternatively, the plaintiffs claimed that the Secretary's actions in approving expenditures of federal funds for use by religious schools were unauthorized by Title I of the
Education Act. Id.at 85.
93. Id. at 85-86. The plaintiffs sued the Secretary charged by Congress with administering the
Education Act, and sought injunctive and declaratory relief. Id. at 85, 87-88.
94. Id.at 85.
95. Id.
96. Id.at 94.
97. Id. at 101.
98. Id.

2007]

Taxpayer Grievances andExecutive Action

whether there was "a logical nexus between the status asserted [by the
taxpayer] and the claim sought to be adjudicated." 99
When federal taxpayers challenge the constitutionality of a federal
spending program, the Flast Court explained, the presence of the requisite nexus is determined by a two-prong test. First, the taxpayer must
show a sufficient "logical link" between his or her taxpayer status and
the type of legislative enactment.10 0 Thus, "a taxpayer will be a proper
party to allege the unconstitutionality only of exercises of congressional
power under the taxing and spending clause of [Article I, Section 8], of
the Constitution."' 0 1
Narrowing the first link even further, the Court admonished, "[i]t
will not be sufficient to allege an incidental expenditure of tax funds in
the administration of an essentially regulatory statute." 10 2 Rather, to have
standing under the first prong of the Flast nexus test, a taxpayer must
challenge the constitutionality of a congressional spending program.
Second, "the taxpayer must show that the challenged enactment exceeds specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of the
congressional taxing and spending power and not simply that the enactment is generally beyond the powers delegated to Congress by [Article I,
Section 8]. ''1 °3 If a taxpayer meets both requirements, the taxpayer is
"deemed" to have the requisite personal stake in the outcome of the controversy sufficient to establish standing to invoke the Judiciary's
power.'0 4 Thus, under Flast, "a taxpayer will have standing consistent
with Article III to invoke federal judicial power when he alleges that
congressional action under the taxing and spending clause is in derogation of those constitutional provisions which operate to restrict the exercise of the taxing and spending power." 10 5 In that case, the Court noted
that the taxpayer's injury would be that "his tax money is being extracted

99. Id. at 102 ("[Ift is both appropriate and necessary to look to the substantive issues ...

to

determine whether there is a logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be
adjudicated."). The Court's approach to the standing problem was unique. See Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 78-79 (1978) ("No cases have been cited outside of

the context of taxpayer suits where we have demanded this type of subject-matter nexus between the
right asserted and the injury alleged, and we are aware of none."); FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 22

(1998) (same).
100. Flast,392 U.S. at 102.
101. Id.

102. Id.
103. Id. at 102-03.

104. Id. at 103.
105. Id. at 105-06.
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constitutional protections against such
and spent in violation of specific
06
power."'
legislative
of
abuses
Applying the two-prong nexus test to the allegations in Flast, the
Court found that the plaintiffs had challenged a congressional exercise of
authority under the Taxing and Spending Clause, and that the challenged
program involved a substantial expenditure of federal tax funds. 10 7 Second, the Court found that the plaintiffs had alleged that the challenged
expenditures violated the Establishment Clause. 0 8 Reflecting on the history behind the Framers' drafting of the Establishment Clause, the Court
noted that those who drafted it specifically feared that the taxing and
spending power would be used in favor of one religion over another or to
support religion in general.' 0 9 Accordingly, the Court held that the Establishment Clause was a specific constitutional limitation imposed upon
Congress's taxing and spending power." 0 Because the plaintiffs had met
both prongs of the nexus test, the Court concluded that the plaintifftaxpayers in Flasthad established standing."'
Rather than ending its inquiry there, the Flast Court announced that2
its two-prong nexus test was consistent with the result in Frothingham.1
The taxpayer in Frothinghammet the first prong of the standing test because she challenged an exercise of congressional authority under the3
Taxing and Spending Clause, namely the Maternity Act of 1921.jj
However, the taxpayer did not have standing because she did not meet
the second prong of the nexus test." 4 She alleged a violation of the Due
Process Clause, which in the Court's view, was not a specific limitation
on Congress's taxing and spending power." 5 The Court made clear that
when a taxpayer does not meet the two-prong nexus requirement, the
general rule against taxpayer standing announced in Frothingham continues to apply-a taxpayer generally may not use a "federal court as a

106. Id.at 106. Notably, unlike the complaint in Frothingham, the complaint in Flast did not
allege that the challenged expenditure would increase the plaintiffs' tax burden.
107. Id.at 103.
108. Id.

109. Id at 103-04.
110. Id. The Flast Court countenanced the possibility that there might be specific limitations

on Congress' taxing and spending power other than the Establishment Clause, but left that determination to future cases. Id. at 105. See also discussion infra Part V.B.
11. Id.at 106.
112. Id.at 104.
113. Id.at 104-05.
114. Id.at 105.
115. Id.
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forum in which to air his generalized grievances about the '' conduct
of
16
System."
Federal
the
in
power
of
allocation
the
or
government
In sum, Flast recognizes the standing only of taxpayers who raise a
specific constitutional challenge to an exercise of congressional authority
under the Taxing and Spending Clause.1 17 Although the Flast decision
may be challenged on a number of bases, 1 8 it has become well-settled
standing law.
The next Part of this Article discusses the Seventh Circuit's Freedom decision, which recognized the standing of taxpayers challenging
executive, not congressional, spending action. The discussion provides
background material helpful to an understanding of this Article's later
critique of the Freedom decision.
III. FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUNDATION, INC. V. CHAO

In 2006, approximately thirty-eight years after Flast, the Seventh
Circuit rendered its decision in Freedom, which dramatically expanded
the category of taxpayers who have standing to sue in that circuit. 1 9 In
Freedom, the Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., a non-stock corporation, and several individual taxpayers, brought suit against several
Executive Branch officials, challenging the constitutionality of the Faith
Based and Community Initiatives (FBCI), on the ground that it violated
the Establishment Clause.120 The FBCI is a policy initiative designed to
establish a national effort to expand opportunities for faith-based and
other community organizations, and to strengthen their capacities to meet
social needs.' 2 ' President Bush created the program through a series of
Executive Orders, which established a central operating office in the
White House and several centers in various federal departments. 122 The
department centers coordinate efforts to eliminate regulatory, contracting, and other programmatic obstacles that would prevent faith-based and

116. Id. at 106.
117. Id. at 105-06 ("[A] taxpayer will have standing consistent with Article Ill to invoke fed-

eral judicial power when he alleges that congressional action under the taxing and spending clause is
in derogation of those constitutional provisions which operate to restrict the exercise of the taxing
and spending power." (emphasis added)).
118. See infra Part VI.A-B.
119. See Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 2006).

120. Id. at 994.
121. See Exec. Order No. 13,199, 3 C.F.R. 752 (2002), reprinted in 3 U.S.C. ch. 2 (Supp. II
2003).
122. See id.; Exec. Order No. 13,198, 3 C.F.R. 750 (2002), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (Supp.
112003); Exec. Order No. 13,280, 3 C.F.R. 262 (2003), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601; Exec. Order No.
13,342, 3 C.F.R. 180 (2005), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601 (West Supp. 2005); Exec. Order No.
13,397, 71 Fed. Reg. 12,275 (2006).
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other community organizations from providing social services.' 23 Accordingly, the department centers hold conferences to provide faithbased and secular community organizations with information about the
federal grant process, funding 124opportunities, and the conditions attached
to the receipt of federal funds.
The crux of the plaintiffs' complaint was that the FBCI program is
designed to promote religious community organizations over secular
ones. 12 5 The plaintiffs claimed that the agencies use the conferences as
propaganda vehicles for religion.' 26 The complaint did not allege that any
of the plaintiffs had participated in the conferences or had been denied
funding as a result of the conferences or the program. 127 Rather, the
plaintiffs asserted their 128
standing to maintain the action based only on
their status as taxpayers.
In an opinion written by Judge Posner, the Freedom court held that
the plaintiffs, as taxpayers, had Article III standing to challenge the constitutionality of the FBCI program under an extension of the Flast exception. 129 The court rested its holding on three apparent conditions or considerations. First, the court indicated that the plaintiffs had challenged an
Executive Branch activity funded by monies derived from congressional
appropriations, as opposed to voluntary donations by citizens. 130 Because
congressional appropriations were the source of the monies that the
Executive Branch allocated in its discretion to the FBCI program, the
Freedom court apparently found that the plaintiffs' challenge to the constitutionality of the program sufficiently implicated the Taxing and
Spending Clause to meet the first prong of the Flast nexus test.' 3 1

123. See Exec. Order No. 13,198, 3 C.F.R. 750 (2002), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (Supp. II
2003); Exec. Order No. 13,280, 3 C.F.R. 262 (2003), reprintedin 5 U.S.C. § 601; Exec. Order No.
13,342, 3 C.F.R. 180 (2005), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601 (West Supp. 2005); Exec. Order No.
13,397, 71 Fed. Reg. 12,275 (2006). In an Executive Order, the President opined that a faith-based
organization, like its secular counterpart, which applies for, or participates in, a social service program supported with federal financial assistance may retain its independence and may continue to
carry out its mission. See Exec. Order No. 13,279, 3 C.F.R. 258, § 2(f) (2003). The difference, the
President has said, is that a faith-based organization that participates in a social service program
supported with Federal financial assistance may "not use direct Federal financial assistance to support any inherently religious activities, such as worship, religious instruction, or proselytization." Id
124. Freedom, 433 F.3d at 993 (citing a FBCI Conference website, http://www.
dtiassociates.com/FBCI/).
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id. at 994.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 996-97.
Id. at 994.
Id.
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Second, the court observed that the challenged activity involved an
expenditure of tax funds incurred for religious purposes 132 and indicated
that there would be no standing "when the marginal or incremental cost
to the taxpaying public of the alleged violation of the establishment
clause would be zero., 133 It is important to recall that under the Flast
nexus test, a taxpayer does not have standing to challenge an "incidental
expenditure of tax funds in the administration of an essentially regulatory
statute., 134 Under Flast, then, a taxpayer has standing to challenge the
constitutionality only of a congressional spending program, not a congressional expenditure incidental to a regulatory aim. The Freedom
court, on the other hand, expressly refused to recognize an analogous
distinction. The court stated that under its formulation of taxpayer standing, a taxpayer would have standing to bring an Establishment Clause
challenge against an expenditure of tax funds, regardless of whether the
expenditure was made as part of a grant-making program or as an incident to the administration of a policy initiative.13 5 Thus, even though the
plaintiffs were challenging the use of expenditures incidental to a policy
initiative, the Freedom court nevertheless held that the plaintiffs had
standing. 136
Third, and finally, the court indicated that the plaintiffs challenged37
the constitutionality of an executive program, not individual action.
The court stated that a plaintiff would not have standing if he or she
claimed merely that "government employees involved in [an otherwise
constitutional] program sometimes wandered out of the neutral zone.''0 38
However, because the plaintiffs had challenged the constitutionality of
the FBCI program
itself, they were within the Freedom court's concep39
standing.'
of
tion

132. Id.
133. Id. at 995. The court offered the following example:

Imagine a suit complaining that the President was violating the clause by including favorable references to religion in his State of the Union address. The objection to his action would not be to any expenditure of funds for a religious purpose; and though an accountant could doubtless estimate the cost to the government of the preparations, security
arrangements, etc., involved in a State of the Union address, that cost would be no greater
merely because the President had mentioned Moses rather than John Stuart Mill. In other
words, the marginal or incremental cost to the taxpaying public of the alleged violation of

the establishment clause would be zero.
Id.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Id. at 996-97.
Id.
Id. at 996.

138. Id.
139. See id.
at 996-97.
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Apparently because the plaintiffs satisfied these three conditions,
they did not lose their standing to challenge the FBCI program merely
because it was an executive rather than a congressional program. 140 In the
Freedom court's view, none of the Supreme Court cases dealing with
taxpayer standing 14 1 precluded the standing of taxpayers to challenge an
Executive Branch program. 142 The court indicated that "it would be too
much of a paradox" to recognize the standing of a taxpayer who challenges a congressional spending program on Establishment Clause
grounds, but not that of a taxpayer who challenges an Executive
1 43
Branch's appropriation of un-earmarked funds on the same grounds.
Thus, the "[t]he difference cannot be controlling."' 144 As a result, the
court's order and recognized that the
Freedom court vacated the district
14
plaintiffs had standing to sue. 1
The majority's decision prompted a strong dissenting opinion from
Judge Ripple, who refused to accept the majority's view "that the applicable Supreme Court precedent permits such a dramatic expansion of
current standing doctrine."' 146 A majority of the active members of the
Court of Appeals denied a petition for rehearing en banc.147 Judge
Ripple, joined by Judges Manion, Kanne, and Sykes, dissented from the
denial of the petition for14 9rehearing. 48 The case is presently pending before the Supreme Court.
IV. THE FREEDOMDECISION CANNOT BE
RECONCILED WITH SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
Having discussed the evolution of taxpayer standing, including the
narrow Flast standing exception and a brief orientation to the Freedom
case, this Article will now critique the Freedom decision. Freedom is the
brainchild of an intermediate appellate court, and thus, this critique is
guided by the overarching principle that federal courts of appeals must

140. Id.

141. E.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm.
to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of
Church &
142.
143.
144.
145.

State Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
Freedom, 433 F.3d at 996.
Id. at 994.
Id.
Id. at 997.

146. Id. at 997 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
147. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 447 F.3d 988 (7th Cir. 2006).

148. Id. at 990.
149. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S.Ct. 722 (2006).
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follow the decisions of the Supreme Court. 50 The first issue, therefore, is
whether the Freedom court's decision conflicts with Supreme Court
precedent.
As an initial matter, it cannot be seriously argued that the Freedom
decision directly conflicts with the holdings in Flast or Frothingham.
The Freedom court held that taxpayers have standing to challenge the
constitutionality under the Establishment Clause of any executive program involving an expenditure of funds derived from congressional appropriations. 15' The Court's holdings in Frothingham and Flast, on the
other hand, dealt with the standing of taxpayers challenging congressional action. Specifically, the Frothingham Court held that a taxpayer
may not bring a suit in federal court challenging the constitutionality of a
congressional appropriation act.1 52 Carving out a narrow exception to that
rule, the Flast Court held that a taxpayer may bring a suit alleging that
congressional action under the Taxing and Spending Clause is a derogation of those constitutional provisions that restrict Congress's taxing and
spending power. 53 Thus, the Freedom court's decision does not directly
run afoul of Flast or Frothingham.
Although the Freedom decision does not conflict with Flast or
Frothingham,the decision directly conflicts with the holdings of the Supreme Court in two post-Flast taxpayer standing cases, Schlesinger v.
Reservists Committee to Stop the War,154 and Valley Forge Christian
55
College v. Americans Unitedfor Separation of Church and State, Inc,'
both of which involved challenges to executive action. In Schlesinger,
decided just five years after Flast, the Court held that a taxpayer could
not maintain a suit challenging the constitutionality of the Executive
Branch's payment of Armed Forces Reserve funds to members of Congress. 156 Similarly, in Valley Forge, decided in 1982, the Court held that

150. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 594 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[I]t remains
this Court's prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents. .. . That is so even where subsequent decisions or factual developments may appear to have significantly undermined the rationale
for our earlier holding." (citation, quotation marks, and emphasis omitted)); State Oil Co. v. Khan,
522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) ("The Court of Appeals was correct in applying that principle despite dis-

agreement with [Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968)], for it is this Court's prerogative alone
to overrule one of its precedents."); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490
U.S. 477, 484 (1989) ("[I]f a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to
rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case

which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.").
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Freedom, 433 F.3d at 996-97.
Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488-89 (1923).
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105-06 (1968).
418 U.S. 208 (1974).
454 U.S. 464 (1982).
Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 228.
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a taxpayer could not maintain a suit challenging the constitutionality of
the Executive
Branch's transfer of a parcel of land to a Christian col57
lege. 1
This Part provides a detailed discussion of Schlesinger and Valley
Forge and argues that the Freedom decision directly conflicts with the
holdings of both cases. In addition, this Part argues that the Freedom decision is not saved by the Court's most recent taxpayer standing case of
Bowen v. Kendrick,158 the lone case in which the Court has recognized
the standing of federal taxpayers since Flast.
A. The Freedom Decision Conflicts with Schlesinger
The most significant problem concerning the Seventh Circuit's decision in Freedom is that it directly conflicts with the Supreme Court's
holding in Schlesinger, which rejected the standing of taxpayers challenging purely executive action.
In Schlesinger, the plaintiffs, the Reservists Committee to Stop the
War and certain named members, filed suit against the Secretary of Defense and other officials, claiming that congressional membership in the
Armed Forces Reserve (Reserve) violated the Incompatibility Clause of
the Constitution. 159 As part of their complaint, the plaintiffs claimed that
the Executive Branch's payment of Reserve funds to Members of Congress was unconstitutional under the Incompatibility Clause.160 The
plaintiffs sought an order reclaiming any monies received by Reservists
during their membership in Congress and requiring the defendants to
strike all Members
of Congress from the rolls of the Reserve, among
6
other relief.' '
The plaintiffs claimed standing on multiple bases, namely as federal
taxpayers, reservists, opponents of the Vietnam War, and citizens of the
United States.' 62 The district court rejected the plaintiffs' assertion of
standing as taxpayers, reservists, and opponents of the Vietnam War, but
allowed them to proceed as citizens and granted partial summary

157. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 482.
158. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
159. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 210-11.
160. Id. at 209. The Incompatibility Clause states,
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have

been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time;
and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either
House during his Continuance in Office.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
161. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 211.
162. Id.
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judgment in their favor.' 63 The court of appeals affirmed. 164 On appeal to
the Supreme Court, the defendants-petitioners challenged the plaintiffs'
question of whether the plaintiffs had standstanding to sue, raising the 165
citizens.
or
ing as taxpayers
After rejecting the plaintiffs' assertion of citizen standing, the
Schlesinger Court considered whether the plaintiffs had standing to sue
as federal taxpayers.' 66 The Court began by observing that Flast "established that status as a taxpayer can, under certain limited circumstances,
supply the personal stake essential to standing."' 167 After reciting the
Flastnexus test, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs did not meet the
first prong of the nexus test because they had challenged executive action, not an enactment of Congress under the Taxing and Spending
Clause. 168 Specifically, the Court explained that the plaintiffs did not
"challenge an enactment under [Article I, Section 8], but rather the action
of the Executive Branch in permitting Members of Congress to maintain
their Reserve status."' 169 The Court noted that the relief the plaintiffs were
seeking would flow from "the invalidity of Executive action in paying
persons who could not lawfully have been Reservists, not from the invalidity of statutes authorizing pay to those who lawfully were Reservists.'

170

On that basis alone, the plaintiffs were denied standing as federal

71
taxpayers for failure to satisfy the Flastnexus test. 1
Schlesinger reflects the Supreme Court's unabashed refusal to recognize the standing of a taxpayer challenging purely executive spending
action. When a taxpayer challenges executive action in expending funds,
instead of the congressional acts authorizing the expenditures, the taxtest, and
payer cannot meet the literal terms of the first prong of the Flast
172
standing.
deny
to
reason
sufficient
a
is
that
Schlesinger,
under

163. Id. at 213-14.
164. Id. at 214.
165. Id.

166. Id. at 227-28.
167. Id. at 227.

168. Id. at 228.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 228 n.17.
171. Id.

172. See Dist. of Columbia Common Cause v. Dist. of Columbia, 858 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (citing Schlesinger for the proposition that the Supreme Court "has refused to extend Flast to
exercises of executive power"); Public Citizen, Inc. v. Simon, 539 F.2d 211, 217 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
("the Schlesinger challenge failed because it was directed at executive conduct"); Schlesinger, 418
U.S. at 229 (noting that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue as taxpayers under Flast because "there is

simply no challenge to an exercise of the taxing and spending power").
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The Freedom court's attempt to distinguish Schlesinger fails. The
Freedom court suggested that Schlesinger is distinguishable because
"taxpayer standing to enforce [a provision] of the Constitution other than
the establishment clause was rejected."' 173 The plaintiffs in Schlesinger
did seek to enforce the Incompatibility Clause, not the Establishment
Clause. 7 4 However, the Schlesinger Court's denial of plaintiffs' standing
as taxpayers expressly and exclusively rested on plaintiffs' failure to
challenge an enactment under Article I, Section 8.175
As in Schlesinger, the plaintiffs in Freedom did not challenge an
enactment under Article I, Section 8. Rather, they challenged Executive
action in holding the FBCI conferences.' 76 Similarly, the relief that the
Freedom plaintiffs sought flowed from the invalidity of executive action
in paying for the costs associated with the FBCI conferences, not from
77
the invalidity of statutes appropriating the funds used to pay the costs. 1
Thus, Freedom falls squarely within the holding of Schlesinger.
In sum, under Schlesinger, plaintiffs may not assert their status as
taxpayers to challenge purely executive spending action. Thus, the plaintiffs in Freedom have no standing to challenge the Executive Branch's
use of monies to fund the FBCI, even if those monies were derived from
congressional appropriations.
B. The Freedom Decision Conflicts with Valley Forge
The Freedom court's decision also conflicts with the holding in
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc. 178 In that case, the Court again denied taxpayer
standing to plaintiffs challenging purely executive action.
In Valley Forge, an association and four of its employees challenged a transfer of land made by the Secretary of the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare to Valley Forge Christian College on the
ground that the transfer violated the Establishment Clause. 179 The Secretary transferred the property pursuant to the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (Federal Property Act).18 0 The Federal
Property Act was designed, in part, to provide an "economical and

173. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989, 996 (7th Cir. 2006).
174. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 209.

175. Id. at 228.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Freedom, 433 F.3d at 993.
See id. at 996.
454 U.S. 464 (1982).
Id. at 468.

180. Id. at 467-68.
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efficient system ... for the disposal of surplus property."18 1 The plaintiffs
asked the district court to declare the conveyance void82and order the college to transfer the property back to the United States.'
The plaintiffs premised their standing to sue on their taxpayer
status. 183 They asserted that as a result of the transfer, they were deprived
issue
of the fair and constitutional use of their tax dollars. 18 4 The 1sole
85
sue.
to
standing
had
plaintiffs
the
whether
was
before the Court
The Valley Forge Court concluded that the plaintiffs did not have
standing because they failed to meet the first prong of the Flast test in
two ways.186 First, the source of the plaintiffs' complaint was not congressional action, but a decision made by the Executive Branch to transfer a parcel of federal property.18 7 The Court noted that under the Flast
nexus test, a taxpayer's challenge must be directed "only [at] exercises of
congressional power."188 Second, the property transfer was not an exer89
cise of authority conferred by the Taxing and Spending Clause.
prong of the nexus test, the plainBecause the plaintiffs failed the first
90
tiffs lacked standing as taxpayers.'
Like Schlesinger, Valley Forge confirms that a taxpayer has standing to challenge only exercises of congressional power, not decisions
made by the Executive Branch. And as with its attempt to distinguish
Schlesinger, the Freedom court's attempt to distinguish Valley Forge is
misguided. The Freedom court suggests that the lack of standing in Valley Forge turned on the fact that the legislation authorizing the challenged transfer was promulgated under the Property Clause, not the
Taxing and Spending Clause.' 9' However, the Valley Forge Court made
test because
clear that the plaintiffs also failed the first prong of the Flast192
action."'
congressional
a
not
is
complaint
their
of
source
"the
Justice Brennan, in his Valley Forge dissent, disagreed with this interpretation of Flast and counseled against drawing any distinctions

181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 466 (quoting 40 U.S.C. § 471 (1976)).
Valley Forge,454 U.S. at 469.
Id.
The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing. Id. The Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit reversed, reasoning that the plaintiffs had standing as citizens, but not as taxpayers. Id. at 470.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 479-80.

187. Id. at 479.
188. Id. (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968)).
189.
190.
191.
192.

Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 480.
Id. at 479.
Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989, 992 (7th Cir. 2006).
Valley Forge,454 U.S. at 479-80.
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between the actions of the legislative branch and those of the executive
branch for the purpose of taxpayer standing. 93 As characterized by the
Valley Forge majority, 194 Brennan opined that a taxpayer should have a
right "to challenge a federal bestowal of largesse" for religious purposes, 95 "regardless of which branch is at work in a particular instance. ' 96 The majority in Valley Forge, however, expressly rejected
Brennan's "revisionist reading" of Flast.197 Valley Forge is therefore
properly read to reject the standing of taxpayers challenging purely
executive action.
The plaintiffs in Valley Forge lacked standing in part because they
did not challenge an exercise of congressional power. 98 Like the plaintiffs in Valley Forge, the plaintiffs in Freedom also did not challenge an
exercise of congressional power. 199 Unlike the plaintiffs in Valley Forge,
however, the plaintiffs in Freedom were deemed to have standing. °°
Consequently, the Freedom court's decision runs directly counter to
Valley Forge.
C. The Freedom Decision Falls Outside of the Purview of Kendrick
Bowen v. Kendrick is the only case since Flast in which the Supreme Court has recognized the standing of federal taxpayers. 2 0 In doing
so, however, the Court confirmed the requirement of a "nexus between
the taxpayer's standing as a taxpayer and the congressional exercise of
taxing and spending power. 20 2 The Freedom court opined that Kendrick
governed the factual situation before it,20 3 but for the reasons explained
below, the Freedom court viewed Kendrick incorrectly.
In Kendrick, the Court considered a challenge to the constitutionality of the Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA), a statute that provided
grants to organizations for services relating to adolescent sexuality and
pregnancy.20 4 Seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the plaintiffs, a group of federal taxpayers, claimed that the statute violated the Establishment Clause on its

193. Id. at 511 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

194. Id. at 485 n.20 (majority opinion).
195. Id. at 509 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 511 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 485 n.20 (majority opinion).
198. Id. at 479.
199. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989, 996-97 (7th Cir. 2006).
200. Id.
201. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
202. Id. at 620.
203. Freedom, 433 F.3d at 993.
204. Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 593.
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face and as applied. 20 5 Although there was no dispute that the plaintiffs
had standing to attack the constitutionality of the statute on its face, the
Court considered whether the plaintiffs, as taxpayers, had standing to
raise an "as applied" challenge to the constitutionality of the statute.20 6
The defendants claimed that the plaintiffs' challenge to the statute "as
applied" was deficient under the Flasttest because the challenge attacked
executive, not congressional, action.20 7
The Kendrick Court rejected defendants' argument because it found
there was a nexus between the plaintiffs' claim and congressional action.20 8 The Court reasoned that the plaintiffs' claim was, by its nature, a
challenge to the congressional taxing and spending power even though
the funding authorized by Congress had flowed through and been improperly administered by the Secretary. 20 9 Like the claim in Flast, the
plaintiffs' claim in Kendrick was brought against the Secretary who administered a spending program that Congress, not the Executive Branch,
had created.2 10 In addition, the AFLA was essentially a program of disbursement of funds, not merely a regulatory statute entailing only an incidental expenditure of funds. 2 11 As such, the Kendrick Court found that
"there [was] ...a sufficient nexus between the taxpayer's standing as a

taxpayer and the congressional exercise of taxing and spending power,
notwithstanding the role the Secretary plays in administering the statute. '212 Thus, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs had standing to
maintain their "as-applied" Establishment Clause claim.21 3
The Freedom court misused the decision in Kendrick, which requires a nexus between taxpayer status and congressional action. Kendrick confirms that a taxpayer has standing to challenge the constitutionality only of an exercise of congressional taxing and spending power
under the Establishment Clause, although the challenge may be brought
as a facial challenge or an attack on the statute as applied.2 14 The plaintiffs in Kendrick had taxpayer standing because they challenged a

205. Id. at
206. Id. at
207. Id.at
208. Id.at
209. Id.
at
210. Id.
at

597.
618.
619.
620.
619.
619-20.

211. Id.

212. Id.
at 620.
213. Id. at 620-21. As to the merits, the Kendrick Court concluded that the statute was constitutional on its face, but remanded the case for a determination as to whether any of the grants made
pursuant to the statutory scheme violated the Establishment Clause. Id.at 620.
214 Seeid at 619-20
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disbursement statute as applied by the Executive Branch.215 In contrast,
the FBCI, challenged by the plaintiffs in Freedom, is not a congressional
disbursement program.21 6 Congress did not specifically authorize the use
of federal tax funds for the FBCI. 217 Rather, the FBCI is strictly an executive policy initiative. 21 8 Hence, the plaintiffs' challenge in Freedom is
not analogous to the challenge in Kendrick.
In conclusion, the Freedom court's decision conflicts with the holdings in two seminal taxpayer standing cases, namely, Schlesinger and
Valley Forge. In both cases, the Court refused to recognize taxpayer
standing in cases involving execution action. Moreover, the Freedom
case is not governed by Kendrick because the plaintiffs in Freedom did
not challenge an appropriation act as applied by the Executive Branch.
For these reasons, the Freedom decision must be reversed as contrary to
Supreme Court precedent.
V. THE FREEDOMDECISION CANNOT

BE JUSTIFIED BASED UPON

ANY REASONABLE EXTENSION OF THE FLASTNEXUS TEST

This Part demonstrates that even if the Freedom decision were determined to be consistent with Supreme Court precedent, it should be
reversed because there is no nexus between the plaintiffs' status as taxpayers and the claim sought to be adjudicated. This nexus is lacking for
at least two reasons. First, there is no logical link between taxpayer status
and a claim challenging executive action. Second, there is no nexus between taxpayer status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged, namely, the Establishment Clause.
A. There is No LogicalLink Between
Taxpayer Status and Executive Action

The conceptual nexus between a taxpayer's status and congressional action arises from the fact that Congress is the branch of government that both enacts tax legislation 219 and appropriates the funds that a

215.
216.
2003).
217.
218.
219.
Taxes ....

Id. at 620.
See Exec. Order No. 13,199, 3 C.F.R. 752 (2002), reprinted in 3 U.S.C. ch. 2 (Supp. 11
Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989, 994 (7th Cir. 2006).
See id.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have the Power To lay and collect
"); U.S. CONST. amend. XVI ("The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on

incomes, from whatever source derived .. "); see also Nat'l Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v. United
States, 415 U.S. 336, 340 (1974) ("Taxation is a legislative function, and [Congress] is the sole
organ for levying taxes.").
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taxpayer contributes. 220 A citizen becomes a taxpayer when Congress
exercises its power to tax, and Congress's power to spend is made possible because taxpayers contribute tax dollars. There is, therefore, a direct,
reciprocal relationship between a taxpayer's status and Congress's exercise of its taxing and spending powers. 221
That relationship is the linchpin
of the first prong of the Flast nexus test.

Unlike Congress, the Executive Branch does not have the constitutional power to tax or spend, but has the more general responsibility of
executing the laws. 222 Its constitutionally-assigned function, therefore, is

not conceptually related in any direct sense to a taxpayer's status. The
lack of a conceptual relationship between a taxpayer's status and executive action was aptly explained by the Court223of Appeals for the District
of Columbia in Public Citizen, Inc. v. Simon.
In Public Citizen, the plaintiffs, a non-profit organization and an individual taxpayer, claimed that members of the White House staff were
devoting a substantial amount of their work time to political activities
instead of official business. 224 The plaintiffs sought an injunction requiring the Secretary of Treasury to reclaim the funds paid to the staff for the
time spent on political activities. 225 The plaintiffs asserted standing based
on their status as taxpayers.2 26 They claimed that the Flast test did not
announce an exclusive test for federal taxpayer suits, but merely stated
the requirements for suits challenging legislative enactments.2 27 The Public Citizen court disagreed, stating that a taxpayer must "clear the hurdles
set by the express terms of the Flast 'nexus' test. '' 228 The court explained
that taxing and appropriations statutes are "in their very nature [] directed
toward taxpayers as a class. 229 In contrast, when the challenged action is
"mere executive activity that entails some expenditures, there is no

220. See U.S. CONST. art. i, § 8 ("The Congress shall have the Power... to provide the com-

mon Defence and general Welfare of the United States .. ");U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9 ("No Money
shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.").
22 1.Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968) ("[A] taxpayer will be a proper party to allege the
unconstitutionality only of exercises of congressional power under the taxing and spending clause of

Art. I, [§] 8, of the Constitution.").
222. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
223. 539 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
224. Id. at 212-13.
225. Id. at 213. Plaintiffs alleged that this activity violated the Appropriations Clause of the

Constitution and 31 U.S.C. § 628, and that the defendant was under duties implied from these provisions to ensure that all congressional appropriations were being used for their designated purposes

and to recover the misspent appropriations for the United States Treasury. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 216.
228. Id. at 216-18.
229. Id. at 218.
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similar arrow aimed at taxpayers as a class, but an activity of concern to
the public at large. 23 ° In other words, "[i]t is this very narrow relationship between the taking of one's tax dollars and Congress's power to tax
and spend which elevates the relationship to the level of a logical link
referred to by the [Flast] Court."'23' That narrow relationship does not
subsist in a taxpayer suit challenging purely executive action.
The loose connection between taxpayer status and executive action
is further exacerbated by the Freedom court's refusal to draw any distinctions between executive spending action and executive policy action.
As noted above, the second of the Freedom court's "conditions" to a
grant of taxpayer standing is merely an expenditure of tax funds without
regard to whether the expenditure is made as part of a grant program or is
incidental to the administration of a policy initiative.23 2 As a result, the
critical distinction made in Flast between spending measures (where
there is standing) and regulatory action entailing an incidental expenditure of tax funds (where there is no standing) does not exist under the
Freedom court's concept of standing.2 33 When the spending/policy distinction falls out of the equation, there is simply no special relationship
between a taxpayer's status and the action challenged. As stated in Public Citizen, when the challenged action is "mere executive activity that
entails some expenditures, there is no similar arrow aimed
at taxpayers as
234
a class, but an activity of concern to the public at large."
The Freedom court's final "condition" to a grant of taxpayer standing also fails to provide the nexus between taxpayer status and executive
action. In satisfaction of its third "condition," the Freedom court noted
that the plaintiffs had challenged the constitutionality of the FBCI
program as a whole, and not simply actions of particular wayward government employees.2 35 However, this peculiarity does not supply the
necessary relationship between the taxpayer's status and executive action. It may narrow the class of cases, but the subject-matter link is not
any more direct because the transgression covers an entire program.
In summary, there is an insufficient nexus between taxpayer status
and executive action. Thus, even if the Freedom decision were

230. Id. at 218-19. The court noted that the plaintiffs' assertion that they claimed the same

"dollars-and-cents impact as Flast"was "a necessary but not sufficient aspect ofFlast." Id. at 218.
231. Id.at 219 n.32 (quoting Morrison v. Callaway, 369 F. Supp. 1160, 1162 (D.D.C. 1974)).
232. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989, 996-97 (7th Cir. 2006).

233. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968). As noted in Flast, taxpayer standing does not
extend to challenges made to "incidental expenditure[s] of tax funds in the administration of an
essentially regulatory statute." Id.
234. Public Citizen, 539 F.2d at 218-19.
235. Freedom, 443 F.3d at 996.
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determined to be consistent with Supreme Court precedent, Freedom
should be reversed because there is no readily discernible conceptual
nexus between a taxpayer's status and a claim challenging executive action.
B. The Establishment Clause Was Not Designedas a
Specific Bulwark Against Executive Spending Abuses
As discussed above, many of the significant problems with recognizing taxpayer standing within the context of executive action revolve
around the first prong of the Flast nexus test. An expansion of taxpayer
standing to cover challenges to executive action also raises questions
concerning the second prong of the nexus test. Under the second prong
of the Flast nexus test, a taxpayer challenging an enactment must show
that it exceeds specific constitutional limitations imposed on Congress's
taxing and spending power; standing is not established by showing that
an enactment generally exceeds the powers delegated to Congress by
Article I, Section 8.236 The Flast Court found that the Establishment
Clause was a specific constitutional limitation imposed upon Congress's
taxing and spending power.237 The Court reasoned that one of the specific evils feared by those who drafted the clause was that the taxing and
spending power would be used in favor of one religion over another or to
support religion in general. 238 This section posits that the Establishment
Clause was not intended as a specific bulwark against executive spending
abuses, and thus, there is no logical nexus between taxpayer status and
the Establishment Clause.
When the Establishment Clause is examined from a purely textual
perspective, it applies only to Congress, not to the other branches of the
federal government. The Establishment Clause reads "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion., 239 It was included
in the Bill of Rights to assure anti-federalists that Congress would not
use its powers (such as taxation or spending) to make laws establishing

236. Flast, 392 U.S. at 102-03.
237. Id. The Flast Court countenanced the possibility that there might be specific limitations
on Congress's taxing and spending power other than the Establishment Clause, but left that determi-

nation to the fate of future cases. Id. at 105.
238. Id.at 103-04.
239. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.See Mark P. Denbeaux, The First Word of the First Amendment, 80
Nw. U. L. REV. 1156, 1170 (1986) (positing that based upon the history behind the Establishment

Clause the word "Congress" was intentionally inserted to limit the scope of the clause's restrictions
to that single branch). The point here is not to argue that the placement of the word "Congress"
limits the scope of the Establishment Clause to that single branch, but that the Clause was not originally intended as a specific limitation on the Executive Branch's spending action.
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religion. 240 The language in the Establishment Clause that "Congress
shall make no law" is the inverse of the language in the Necessary and
Proper Clause, which provides that "Congress shall have Power ...To
make all Laws.",241 This textual parallelism suggests that the drafters of
the Constitution crafted the Establishment Clause as a specific limitation
on Congress's power to make laws.2 42 The commonly accepted position
that the First Amendment applies to the other branches of federal government finds support in other constitutional sources, such as the "reflex"
character of the First Amendment, 243 the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, 244 and the general structure of the Constitution, 245 not the
text itself.
The history behind the drafting of the Establishment Clause also
suggests that the clause was intended as a specific limitation on

240. Id.at 1169.
241. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.18.
242. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 814 (1999). Professor
Amar observed what he called a "textual interlock" between the First Amendment and the Necessary
and Proper Clause. Id.He noted that the operative words "Congress," "shall," "make," and "law,"
appear in the same order in both the clauses. Id. He opined that the textual link was no coincidence
but part of a deep structural design, as "[t]he First Amendment was drafted to reassure all concerned
that Congress lacked enumerated power to restrict speech and press (or to regulate religion, for that
matter) in the states, notwithstanding the Necessary and Proper Clause." Id.
243. See Robert Destro, The Structure of the Religious Liberty Guarantee, 11 J.L. & RELIGION
355, 371 (noting that in Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454,
464 (1907), Harlan indicated that the First Amendment is to be regarded as having a reflex character
that applies to all levels of government).
244. See Shrum v. City of Coweta, 449 F.3d 1132, 1142-43 (10th Cir. 2006). In Shrum, Judge
McConnell opined that the meaning behind the use of the word "Congress" in the First Amendment
must derive from one of the two structural purposes of the Bill of Rights, which were to limit the
reach of the protections of the personal rights in the first eight amendments to the federal government, and to set forth the individual freedoms in a document separate from the main body of the
constitutional document. Id.at 1140-41. His primary position was that because the limitation of the
First Amendment to Congress would not advance either of these two purposes, there was likely no
intention to confine the reach of the First Amendment to the legislative branch. Id.at 1141. Notably,
however, he suggested that "if the First Amendment itself applied narrowly only to Congress and
only to the making of 'laws,"' the protections afforded by the First Amendment apply to the executive branch by virtue of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id.at 1142-43. He noted
that because the Due Process Clause forbids the Executive Branch from taking away liberties except
pursuant to "law," it follows that the First Amendment, through the Fifth, protects against executive
as well as legislative abridgement. Id at 1143.
245. See Destro, supranote 243, at 372-75 ("[T]he only instances in which the President could
make a plausible argument that the religious liberty guarantees of the First Amendment do not apply
to executive action are those in which the chief executive is authorized by the Constitution to act
independently of Congress."). As provided in the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution, the
President is not authorized to spend money independently of congressional authorization. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.7. Therefore, by virtue of the structural constraints imposed upon the Executive
Branch, the religious liberty guarantees of the First Amendment apply to executive action. See Destro, supra note 243, at 372-75.
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congressional, rather than executive, power. That history was vividly
illustrated by the Supreme Court in Everson v. Board of Education.246 As
noted in Everson, prior to 1789, nearly every American colony exacted a
tax for church support.24 7 The colonies forced men and women, whether
believers or non-believers, to pay taxes to support government-sponsored
churches.248 When colonists failed to pay the taxes and tithes, spoke disrespectfully of the views of ministers of the government-sponsored
churches, or did not attend church, they were subjected to severe punishments, including fines, imprisonment, torture, or death. 249 These
practices "shock[ed] the freedom-loving [colonists] into a feeling of abhorrence" and "aroused their indignation. '' 2' ° As these practices began to
thrive, dissenting colonists, including most notably James Madison,
formed a movement aimed toward achieving individual religious liberty
in America. 251
The movement reached a climax when the Virginia Legislature was
about to renew its tax levy for church support. 2 In opposition to the
Virginia church tax, Madison wrote the famous Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments. 253 In that document, Madison
argued that no person should be taxed to support a religious institution of
any kind.254 He posited that "the same authority which can force a citizen
to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one
establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in
all cases whatsoever.,' 255 He conveyed his concern that if the tax bill
were renewed, "the will of the Legislature [would be] the only measure
of their authority." 256 Specifically, he feared that "in the plenitude of this
authority, [the Legislature] may sweep away all our fundamental
rights... [and] may swallow up the Executive and Judiciary Powers. 257

246. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947).
247. Id. at 10 n.8.

248. Id. at 10.
249. Id. at 9.
250. Id. at 11. "The imposition of taxes to pay ministers' salaries and to build and maintain

churches and church property aroused their indignation." Id.
251. Id. at 11-12. "The concern of Madison and his supporters was quite clearly that religious

liberty ultimately would be the victim if government could employ its taxing and spending powers to
aid one religion over another or to aid religion in general." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103-04

(1968).
252. Everson, 330 U.S. at 11.
253. Id. at 11-12.
254. See JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL & REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS,
2 (1785), reprintedin Everson, 330 U.S. at 65, app.
255. See id. at 3, reprintedin Everson, 330 U.S. at 65-66 app.

256. Id. at
257. Id.

15 (emphasis added).
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As a result of the efforts of Madison, as well as those of Thomas
Jefferson and others, the Virginia tax levy was never reenacted.2 1 8 The
same strong sentiments that led to the renunciation of the Virginia tax
found expression in the First Amendment, 59 which has been consistently
construed with reference to its history and the evils it was designed to
suppress.26 °
The history of the Establishment Clause leads to the conclusion that
the colonists feared abuses specifically perpetuated by the Legislature.
Against this historical backdrop, Justice Warren penned the Flastexception to the rule against taxpayer standing and opined that the Establishment Clause was designed as a specific constitutional limitation imposed
on Congress's taxing and spending power. 26 1 But when the history of the
Establishment Clause is compounded with the textual parallelism between the Establishment Clause and Article I, there is a fair argument
that the Establishment Clause was not intended as a specific bulwark
against executive spending abuses.
If the Establishment Clause is not specifically intended to prevent
executive spending, a taxpayer who challenges an executive spending
program is in the same position in which Mrs. Frothingham found herself.262 Such a taxpayer cannot claim that the Executive Branch has
breached any specific constitutional limitations imposed upon its "spending power."
The "reflex" character of the First Amendment, the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the general structure of the Constitution were almost certainly not specifically intended to protect taxpayers
against increases in tax liability. Therefore, like Mrs. Frothingham, taxpayers challenging executive spending must resolve their grievances
through the political process, as the federal court system is not the proper

258. Everson, 330 U.S. at 12. Instead, the Virginia Legislature enacted the Virginia Bill for

Religious Liberty, whose preamble stated that "to compel a man to furnish contributions of money
for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical." Thomas Jefferson,
Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, pmbl. 12 W.W. Hening, Statutes at Large of Virginia 84 (1823)
reprinted in Everson, 330 U.S. at 13 app.
259. Everson, 330 U.S. at 13.
260. Id.
261. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968).
262. See discussion supra Part II.A. Mrs. Frothingham claimed that her tax liability would be
increased as a result of the allegedly unconstitutional enactment of the Maternity Act of 1921. 392
U.S. at 105. She was unsuccessful in part because she did not "claim that the harm she alleged resulted from a breach by Congress of the specific constitutional limitations imposed upon an exercise
of the taxing and spending power." Id.
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forum in which to "air [] generalized grievances about the 263
conduct of
government or the allocation of power in the Federal System.
For these reasons, even if it were determined to be consistent with
Supreme Court precedent, the Freedom decision should be reversed because there is no nexus between the plaintiffs' status as taxpayers and
their challenge. There is no logical link between their status as taxpayers
and the Executive Branch's FBIC program, nor is there a nexus between
their taxpayer status and the Establishment Clause.
VI. THE FREEDOMCOURT'SEXPANSIVE

CONSTRUCTION OF FLAST

IS UNTENABLE UNDER MODERN STANDING DOCTRINE

This Part demonstrates that even if the Freedom decision were determined to be consistent with Supreme Court precedent, it should be
reversed for an additional reason: the Freedom court's expansion of taxpayer standing is untenable under modem standing doctrine.
For background purposes, section A begins with a discussion of the
theory of standing upon which the Flast decision was premised. Section
B then presents a brief primer on the modem standing doctrine that has
developed since Flast. Section C argues that taxpayer standing is at odds
with modem standing doctrine because a taxpayer bringing a suit challenging governmental spending does not suffer the concrete injury required under modern standing law. Most importantly, section D finally
posits that the concept of taxpayer standing prescribed in the Freedom
decision cannot be sustained under modern standing doctrine.
A. The Flast Court's View of Standing
This section takes a closer look at the concept of standing upon
which the 1968 Flast decision was based. This background material is
helpful to understanding the concept of standing under modern doctrine.
In addressing the issue of standing, the Flast Court started its analysis by identifying the limitations embedded in the "case-andcontroversy" requirement of federal court jurisdiction.264 The Court
observed there are two complementary limitations embedded in the caseand-controversy requirement.2 65 First, the case-and-controversy requirement limits the business of the federal courts to "questions presented in
an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of

263. Id. at 106.
264. Id. at 94.
265. Id. at 94-95.
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judicial resolution."2 66 Second, the Court stated, the case-and-controversy
requirement prevents the judiciary
from invading areas committed to the
267
government.
of
branches
other
After setting out these two limitations, the Flast Court opined that
the standing inquiry speaks only to the first limitation concerning the
type of question presented, not to the second limitation concerning the
separation of powers. 268 The Court opined that the standing question
"does not, by its own force, raise separation of powers problems related
to improper judicial interference in areas committed to other branches of
the Federal Government., 269 Instead, Article III limits the question of
standing only to "whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be
presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as
capable of judicial resolution., 270 To make that determination, the Court
stated that examining the substantive issues is both appropriate and necessary "to determine whether there is a logical nexus between the status
asserted [by the litigant] and the claim sought to be adjudicated.,27 1
Hence, at the time of Flast,the Supreme Court did not conceive of
standing as an issue raising separation of powers concerns, nor did it require the plaintiff to allege a concrete injury suffered as a result of the
defendants' actions. The Flast Court did not have the benefit of Justice
Powell's wise words that "[r]elaxation of standing requirements is directly related to the expansion of judicial power," which in turn "alter[s]
the allocation of power at the national level, with a shift away from a
democratic form of government." 27 2 With this background in mind, the
following section discusses the idea of standing under modem doctrine.
B. The Evolution of Standing Doctrine After Flast:
Separation of Powers and Concrete Injury
Since Flast, standing doctrine has dramatically changed. Now, the
Supreme Court recognizes that "the law of [Article] III standing is built

266. Id.at 95. The Court explained that the concept of standing, along with the rules against
political questions, advisory opinions, and mooted questions, constitute the family of principles that
serve to limit the jurisdiction of the federal court to "cases" and "controversies." Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.at 100-01.

269. Id.at 100.
270. Id. at 101.
271. Id. at 102. The Court's approach to the standing problem was unique. See Duke Power
Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 78-79 (1978) ("No cases have been cited

outside of the context of taxpayer suits where we have demanded this type of subject-matter nexus
between the right asserted and the injury alleged, and we are aware of none."); FEC v. Akins, 524
U.S. 11, 22 (1998) (same).
272. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
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on a single basic idea-the idea of separation of powers. ,,273 Justice
Scalia has observed that when Flast was decided, "it was thought that the
only function of the constitutional requirement of standing was 'to assure
274
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues."'
However, it is now thought that "the constitutional requirement is a
means of defining the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite
275
allocation of power.

As a means to achieving this conceptual end, in the 1970 cases of
276
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp
and Barlow v. Collins,277 the Supreme Court adopted the "injury-in-fact"
requirement, which is the centerpiece of modem standing doctrine. As
the Court has observed, the requirement of a concrete injury to establish
standing places the decision as to whether review will be sought in the
hands of those who have a direct stake in the outcome.278 The concrete
injury requirement also serves to "limit the federal judicial power to
those disputes which confine the federal courts to a role consistent with a
system of separated powers and which are traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process. 2 79
Through a myriad of standing cases, the injury-in-fact requirement
has evolved into a three-part test. To invoke the jurisdiction of a federal
court, first, a plaintiff must suffer from an injury-in-fact that is "concrete
and particularized, and [] actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical., 280 As used in standing doctrine, "particularized" means that the
injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way. 281 Second, "there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent

273. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984). As noted above, the FlastCourt improvidently

presumed that the standing inquiry speaks only to whether the question posed for adjudication is
presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable ofjudicial resolution.
See Flast, 392 U.S. at 100. The Court opined that the standing question "does not, by its own force,
raise separation of powers problems related to improper judicial interference in areas committed to
other branches of the Federal Government." Id.
274. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 11 (1998) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204

(1962)).
275. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 11 (quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted).
276. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
277. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
278. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464,473 (1982); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 (1972).
279. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

280. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).

281. Id. at 560 n.l.
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action of some third party not before the court.''2 82 Third, "it must be
likely as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed
by a favorable decision. ,,283 A plaintiff alleging a personal injury that
meets these three requirements satisfies the Article III standing
requirement.284
C.The Concept of Taxpayer Standing is at Odds
with the Concrete Injury Requirement
As Judge Easterbrook rhetorically asked, the critical question under
modem standing doctrine is "Where's the concrete injury?, 285 As demonstrated below, the answer is that a taxpayer bringing a suit challenging
governmental spending does not suffer any concrete injury. Hence, the
concept of taxpayer standing does not comport with modem Article III
standing doctrine.
In Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans Unitedfor Separation of Church and State, Inc., the Supreme Court theorized that "a taxpayer alleges injury only by virtue of his liability for taxes." 286 Although
the meaning of this statement is not altogether clear, it likely does not
mean that a taxpayer suffers injury in the form of an increase in his tax
liability-that position was properly rejected in Frothingham.287 The
likelihood of any tax increase as a result of a single expenditure is remote
and speculative. The average federal taxpayer's tax liability is deter-

282. Id. at 560 (citation, quotation marks, brackets, and ellipses omitted).
283. Id. at 561 (citation and quotation marks omitted). "The 'fairly traceable' and 'redressability' components of the constitutional standing inquiry were initially articulated by [the Supreme]
Court as two facets of a single causation requirement." Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n.19
(1984) (quotation marks and citations omitted). "To the extent there is a difference, it is that the
former examines the causal connection between the assertedly unlawful conduct and the alleged
injury, whereas the latter examines the causal connection between the alleged injury and the judicial
relief requested." Id.
284. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. The Supreme Court's previous opinions were unclear as to
whether particular features of the standing requirement were required by Article III or were merely
rules ofjudicial restraint. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church
& State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982). A line of decisions in the 1970s clarified that the injury-infact requirement is, indeed, an Article III constitutional requirement. Id. at 472. In addition to the
injury-in-fact constitutional requirement, the Supreme Court has identified three more limitations on
its judicial power that serve as prudential rules of self-restraint. See id. at 474-75. First, there is a
rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances widely shared by a large class of citizens. Id.
Second, the prudential component of standing generally prohibits a litigant from raising another
person's legal rights. Id. Third, a plaintiffs complaint must fall within the zone of interests protected
by the statutory or constitutional guarantee in question. Id.
285. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 447 F.3d 988, 989 (7th Cir. 2006) (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
286. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 478.
287. See Frothingham v.Mellon, 262 U.S.447,487-88 (1923).
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mined by a fixed tax rate and fixed exemption, deduction, and credits
amounts. Historically, Congress has changed the tax rate and these
amounts as a result of wars, changing economic cycles, inflation, and
significant shifts in the role of government, 288 not as a result of a single
expenditure of funds out of the treasury. At the time Flast was decided,
there was no way to predict whether Congress would effectuate a tax rate
hike as a result of the one billion dollars that it appropriated to the Executive Branch to implement the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act in 1965, and the Supreme Court did not attempt to speculate whether
it would.
Furthermore, as a practical matter, the concept of taxpayer standing
cannot be justified based upon an inference of a monetary injury. As Professor Kenneth E. Scott has observed, the Flast opinion "devoted not a
word to demonstrating Mrs. Flast's actual monetary stake as a taxpayer. ''289 Instead, the opinion looked to the existence of a logical nexus
between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated.2 90
Indeed, Justice Harlan noted in his dissenting opinion in Flast that "[t]he
complaint in this case, unlike that in Frothingham,contains no allegation
that the contested expenditures will in any fashion affect the amount of
these taxpayers' own existing or foreseeable tax obligations. 29 1
More recently, the Court has conceptualized "the injury.., to be
the very extraction and spending of tax money in aid of religion alleged
by a plaintiff. '292 This conception of taxpayer injury tracks language in
the Flast opinion, but again a taxpayer cannot claim any injury-in-fact as

288. See generally United States Dep't of the Treasury, History of the U.S. Tax System,
http://www.treasury.gov/education/fact-sheets/taxes/ustax.shtml (last visited Feb. 19, 2007).
289. Scott, supra note 78, at 661.
The opinion by Chief Justice Warren emphasizes the view that standing turns on whether
the plaintiff has the "requisite personal stake in the outcome." However, if personal stake
refers to the monetary difference the outcome of the litigation may make to the plaintiff
as a taxpayer, the opinion and its distinctions become incomprehensible, forthe opinion
devoted not a word to demonstrating Mrs. Flast's actual monetary stake as a taxpayer,
and it is doubtful that the Court could have made such a demonstration.
Id. at 661 (footnote omitted).
290. See id.
291. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 118 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
292. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 1865 (2006) (citation, quotation marks,
and brackets omitted); see also Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 514 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he plaintiffs' invocation of the Establishment Clause was of decisive importance in resolving the standing issue in
[Flast]."). In DaimlerChrysler,the Court noted that "an injunction against the spending would of
course redress that injury, regardless of whether lawmakers would dispose of the savings in a way
that would benefit the taxpayer-plaintiffs personally." 126 S.Ct. at 1862 (emphasis omitted).
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a result of a government expenditure in aid of religion.29 3 As Judge
Easterbrook noted, "[t]o the extent that the Establishment Clause forbids
taxation to support religion, people subject to the illegal levy may obtain
relief." 294 However, taxpayers do not pay "one extra penny" as a result of
a governmental expenditure in aid of religion.2 95
A federal taxpayer has no cognizable interest in the funds of the
U.S. treasury.29 6 As Justice Harlan noted in his dissenting opinion in
Flast, tax payments received by the treasury become part of the Government's general funds, the congressional expenditure of which must "provide for the common Defense and general Welfare., 297 Any rights of the
taxpayer with respect to his tax payments are extinguished when he releases his payments into the treasury. 298 Thereafter, the United States
holds the general funds, not as a stakeholder or trustee for those who

293. The Court was likely using the term "injury" in its legal sense, as meaning a wrong which
directly results in the violation of a legal right. See, e.g., Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464,
479 (1938). There was standing in Flast because the plaintiffs alleged an invasion of a legally protected interest or legal right created by the Establishment Clause, as in that clause "every taxpayer
can claim a personal constitutional right not to be taxed for the support of a religious institution."
Flast,392 U.S. at 114 (Stewart, J., concurring). However, as the Supreme Court has noted,
In some fashion, every provision of the Constitution was meant to serve the interests of
all. Such a generalized interest, however, is too abstract to constitute a 'case or controversy' appropriate for judicial resolution. The proposition that all constitutional provisions are enforceable by any citizen simply because citizens are the ultimate beneficiaries
of those provisions has no boundaries.
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 226-27 (1974). Moreover, the
concept of a legal injury does not satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of modem standing doctrine.
294. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 447 F.3d 988, 989 (7th Cir. 2006) (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
295. Id.
296. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), the Supreme Court appeared to
reintroduce some notion of the "legal interest" test into standing doctrine. The Court noted that to
satisfy the Article Ill injury requirement a plaintiff must allege an invasion of a "legally protected
interest" which is concrete and particularized. Id. at 560. Since then, in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S.
93 (2003), the Supreme Court rejected the standing of plaintiffs seeking to challenge a provision of
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), which amended Section 315(a)(1) of the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) and increased certain FECA contribution limits.
The plaintiffs asserted that the increases in hard-money limits enacted by the BCRA provision deprived them of an equal ability to participate in the election process based on their economic status.
Id. at 227. Nevertheless, the Court refused to recognize the plaintiffs' standing, reasoning that it had
"never recognized a legal right comparable to the broad and diffuse injury asserted by the [plaintiffs]." Id. (emphasis added). The McConnell Court's reference to the lack of a legally protected
right is notable because it is unrelated to the principle of an injury-in-fact and is reminiscent of
standing doctrine prior to Data Processingand Barlow. See supra text accompanying notes 276-77.
To the extent that Lujan and McConnell indicate that a plaintiff must assert a legally protected interest to have standing, the entire concept of taxpayer standing would seem to fold.
297. Flast, 392 U.S. at 118-19 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1).
298. See id at 119 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

2007]

Taxpayer Grievancesand Executive Action

have contributed to the treasury, but for the population at large. 299 Hence,
any unconstitutional use of the funds in the treasury would not violate
any present interest or right of the taxpayer. 0 0
Moreover, there is no cognizable injury to a taxpayer's conscience
and sensibilities in observing the government expend tax money in aid of
religion. The Court has "repeatedly held that an asserted right to have the
Government act in accordance with law is not sufficient, standing alone,
to confer jurisdiction on a federal court. ' ' 30 ' For example, in Schlesinger
v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, the Court rejected a claim of
citizen standing involving a challenge to the constitutionality of the
30 2
Armed Forces Reserve membership of certain members of Congress.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger reasoned that the plaintiffs
had not alleged a concrete injury, only the "the abstract injury in nonobservance of the Constitution asserted by respondents as citizens. 3 °3 Burger further explained that "[t]o permit a complainant who has no concrete injury to require a court to rule on important constitutional issues in
the abstract would create the potential for abuse of the judicial process
[and] distort the role30of
the Judiciary in its relationship to the Executive
4
and the Legislature.,

Supreme Court precedent has also established that "the psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with
which one disagrees.., is not an injury sufficient to confer standing under [Article] III even [if] the disagreement is phrased in constitutional
terms. 30 5 Such an injury is not sufficiently personalized to warrant invo-

299. Id.; cf Kate Stith, Congress'Powerof the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1356 (1988) ("All
funds belonging to the United States-received from whatever source, however obtained, and
whether in the form of cash, intangible property, or physical assets-are public monies, subject to
public control and accountability.").
300. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 118-19 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan also explained that
The interests [the taxpayer] represents, and the rights he espouses, are, as they are in all
public actions, those held in common by all citizens. To describe those rights and interests as personal, and to intimate that they are in some unspecified fashion to be differentiated from those of the general public, reduces constitutional standing to a word game
played by secret rules.
Id. at 128-29.
301. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754 (1984) (citing Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Laird v.
Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972)).
302. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. 208.
303. Id at 223 n.13.
304. Id at 222.
305. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 485-86 (1982) (disagreeing with the court of appeals's view that plaintiffs had established
standing by virtue of an injury-in-fact to their alleged right to a government that does not establish
religion). Of course, the Valley Forge Court did not suggest that a psychological injury can never be
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cation of federal court jurisdiction. Of course, "the intensity of a litigant's interest or the fervor of his advocacy" may suggest concrete
adverseness, but concrete adverseness "is the anticipated consequence of
proceedings commenced by one who has been injured in fact; it is not a
permissible substitute for the showing of injury itself., 30 6 Although a
taxpayer may invest his tax dollars in the federal government and thereby
have a "pecuniary stake" in good governance,30 7 that stake would only
serve to intensify the taxpayer's interest in a controversy or the increase
the fervor of his advocacy; it does not satisfy the requirement of an
308
injury itself.
Finally, it is not sufficient that others may have suffered from the
spending action that the taxpayer challenges. The Court has rejected the
standing of plaintiffs who have alleged not a personal harm, but harm
suffered by others or the public generally. 30 9 Allen v. Wright is perhaps
the best example.31 0 In that case, the Court refused to recognize the
standing of parents of black public school children seeking to challenge
the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) procedures in granting of tax exemptions to racially discriminatory private schools. 3 11 The plaintiffs
claimed injury in the denigration they suffered as a result of the government's provision of financial aid to discriminatory private schools.3 12 The
Court rejected the notion that such "stigmatizing injury" to persons who
are not personally subject to unequal treatment accords a basis for standing and reiterated well-established law that a mere complaint that the
government is violating the law is not enough to confer standing.31 3 As
Justice O'Connor stated, "[r]ecognition of standing in such circum-

a sufficient basis for the conferral of Article III standing, but its sufficiency as a basis for standing
depends on the directness of the harm alleged. See, e.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Found.
v. Ashbrook, 375 F.3d 484, 489 n.3 (6th Cir. 2004).
306. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486; see also Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 226 ("Respondents'

motivation has indeed brought them sharply into conflict with petitioners, but as the Court has noted,
motivation is not a substitute for the actual injury needed by the courts and adversaries to focus
litigation efforts and judicial decision making.").
307. Nancy C. Staudt, Taxation Without Representation, 55 TAX L. REV. 555, 583 (2002).
"The pecuniary stake in Flast, for example, was somewhere in the range of $0.12 to $2.40." Id.
(citations omitted).
308. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486.
309. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
310. Id.

311. Id.at 753-54.
312. Id.at 755.
313. Id.at 755-56.
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stances would transform the federal courts into 'no more than a vehicle
3 14
for the vindication of the value interests of concerned bystanders."
Similarly, in Sierra Club v. Morton, the Supreme Court denied
standing to an organization seeking to enjoin federal officials from approving an extensive ski development in the Mineral King Valley in the
Sequoia National forest. 315 Although the Court noted that injuries other

than economic harm are sufficient to create standing, it clarified that the
injury-in-fact test requires that the party seeking review be among the
injured.31 6 Since the complaint failed to allege that any of the members of
the Sierra Club used Mineral King for any purpose, the Court concluded
that the organization lacked standing.31 7
In summary, courts and scholars have criticized Flast's criteria for
taxpayer standing "for failing to provide a measurement of the adverse
interest of a plaintiff in the outcome. 3 18 Professor Scott opined that the
Flast nexus test may be best understood as "an expedient by a court retreating from the absolute barrier of Frothingham,but not sure how far to
go and desirous of a formula that would enable it to make case by case
determinations in the future., 319 As demonstrated above, that expedient
cannot be reconciled with modem standing law.

314. Id.at 756 (quoting United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures,
412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973)). Justice O'Connor observed that "[i]f the abstract stigmatic injury were
cognizable, standing would extend nationwide to all members of the particular racial groups against
which the Government was alleged to be discriminating by its grant of a tax exemption to a racially
discriminatory school, regardless of the location of that school." Allen, 468 U.S. at 755-56.
O'Connor indicated that "[c]onstitutional limits on the role of the federal courts preclude such a
transformation." Id. at 756.
315. 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972).
316. Id.According to the Court,
Aesthetic and environmental well-being, like economic well-being, are important ingredients of the quality of life in our society, and the fact that particular environmental interests are shared by the many rather than the few does not make them less deserving of legal protection through the judicial process. But the 'injury in fact' test requires more than
an injury to a cognizable interest. Itrequires that the party seeking review be himself
among the injured.
Id.
317. Id. at 735. The opinion in Sierra Club constitutes a clear rejection of the view that the
scope of the Judicial power includes the power to entertain "public actions." See Scott, supra note
78, at 667.
318. See Public Citizen, Inc. v. Simon, 539 F.2d 211, 215 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (citation omitted).
As noted in Justice Harlan's dissent in Flast, "[t]he difficulties with [the Flast] criteria are many and
severe, but it is enough for the moment to emphasize that they are not in any sense a measurement of
any plaintiffs interest in the outcome of any suit." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 121 (1968) (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
319. Scott, supra note 78, at 661; see also Leonard & Brant, supra note 62, at 124 ("Flast was
an under-the-table attempt to establish an exception to the personal stake requirement for Establishment Clause claims.").
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To be clear, the foregoing section does not call on the Supreme
Court to overrule the Flast decision, which has become well-settled law
in federal jurisprudence. However, because of the conflict between the
concept of taxpayer standing and modem standing doctrine, the Flast
exception should not be extended beyond its moorings, as discussed in
the next section.
D. The Freedom Court's Concept of Taxpayer
Standing Conflicts with Modern Standing Doctrine
Even assuming arguendo that the Freedom decision does not directly conflict with Supreme Court precedent, the decision should nevertheless be reversed because the Freedom court's concept of taxpayer
standing is untenable under modem standing doctrine. As discussed below, when a taxpayer challenges the Executive Branch's expenditure of
money in consequence of a congressional appropriation of un-earmarked
funds, as was the case in Freedom, not only is the likelihood of an
increase in tax liability remote and speculative, but there are also significant implications for the separation of powers of government.
In Freedom, the plaintiffs challenged an executive policy initiative
for which Executive Branch officials appropriated un-earmarked funds
handed them by Congress. 320 The plaintiffs' theory of injury in such a
case would be contingent upon a string of speculative events: (1) federal
agencies increasing their total annual estimated budget levels as a direct
result of the expenses attributable to the FBCI, as opposed to reducing
other aspects of their budgets; (2) the President, with the guidance of the
Office of Management and Budget, increasing the overall budget proposals provided to Congress as a direct result of the increased budget needs
of the federal agencies due to the FBCI; (3) Congress approving the requested budget increases associated with the FBCI; and (4) Congress
enacting a tax rate hike as a result of an increase in the overall budget
due to the FBCI. 321 The speculative nature of the taxpayer's injury is

highlighted by recent budget estimates indicating that the federal
government will receive total gross revenue in 2006 of
$2,403 ,000,000,000.322

320. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 2006).
321. See generally OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOV'T,
FISCAL YEAR 2007 375-96 (2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2007/
pdf/concepts.pdf.
322. U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET & ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: AN UPDATE Table I3 (2006), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/74xx/doc7492/08-17-BudgetUpdate.pdf.
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The Supreme Court has rejected similar attempts to premise standing to sue based upon speculative injuries.323 As Chief Justice Rehnquist
once said, "[a]llegations of possible future injury do not satisfy the requirements of [Article] 111.,324
More importantly, the concept of taxpayer standing to challenge
executive spending action does not honor the separation of powers principle that forms the basis of standing doctrine. 325 In the famous case of
Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall stated that "[t]he province of
the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals.' 326 In contrast,

323. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 156-61 (1990). In Whitmore, the Supreme
Court rejected the standing of a death row inmate challenging the validity of a death sentence imposed on another death row inmate, Ronald Gene Simmons, who elected to forego his right of appeal
to the state supreme court. Id. Whitmore argued that the State of Arkansas' system of comparative
review in death penalty cases would ultimately injure him when the state supreme court failed to
review Simmons' death sentence. Id. at 156-57. The Whitmore Court concluded that "the alleged
injury [was] too speculative to invoke the jurisdiction of an Art. III court." Id. at 157. The Court
explained that the alleged injury was contingent on, first, Whitmore's failure to secure federal habeas
relief; second, another trial, conviction, and death sentence; and finally, the refusal of the Supreme
Court of Arkansas to set aside his second death sentence based upon its failure to review Simmons'
death sentence. Id.; see also O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
In O'Shea, the Supreme Court denied standing in a case where the claimed injury was contingent
on the plaintiff first being arrested for, and charged with, a violation of a criminal law, and then
being subjected to bond proceedings, trial, or sentencing before the defendant magistrate and circuit
court judge charged with the unlawful conduct. Id. at 497. The Court declined to exercise jurisdiction because the injury took it "into the area of speculati[on] and conjecture." Id. Similarly, in City
of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), the Supreme Court refused to recognize the standing of
a plaintiff whose speculative injury was contingent on him being stopped for an offense by an officer
or officers who would then use the challenged chokehold on him without any provocation or resistance on his part. Id. at 105.
At the very outer limit of the law of standing, in United States v. Students ChallengingRegulatory
Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973), the Court recognized the standing of several
environmental groups complaining that a general freight rate increase sought by substantially all of
the railroads in the United States, which was approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission,
would allegedly cause increased use of nonrecyclable commodities as compared to recyclable goods, thus resulting in the need to use more natural resources to produce such
goods, some of which resources might be taken from the Washington area, and resulting
in more refuse that might be discarded in national parks in the Washington area.
Id. at 688. Despite the fact that string of events had to occur before the alleged injury would materialize, the SCRAP Court found that the environmental groups' alleged injury was not speculative. Id.
at 689-90. The Whitmore Court distinguished SCRAP because "the plaintiffs in SCRAP may have
been able to show at trial that the string of occurrences alleged would happen immediately[,]"
whereas Whitmore could not responsibly make a similar claim of immediate harm. 495 U.S. at 159.
Like Whitmore, taxpayers challenging executive spending action, such as the plaintiffs in Freedom,
cannot responsibly make a claim of immediate harm, as there is no possibility that taxpayers could
prove at trial a chain of events culminating in an imminent tax increase.
324. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 158 ("A threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact.") (citations and quotation marks omitted).
325. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984).
326. 5 U.S. 137. 170 (1803).
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as Justice Scalia has said, "[v]indicating the public interest (including the
public interest in Government observance of the Constitution and laws)
is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive."32' 7 This system of
distribution of grievances reflects the essence of our democratic system
of government. The Judiciary was never intended to have
general over328
sight authority over the elected branches of government.
In the absence of an actual present or immediately threatened injury, it is not the role of the Judiciary to serve as "continuing monitors of
the wisdom and soundness of Executive action; such a role is appropriate
for the Congress acting through its committees and the 'power of the
purse. ,329 In other words, the Founders did not. intend for the Judiciary
to serve, in the nature of a New England town meeting, to oversee the
conduct of the national government by means of lawsuits in federal
courts. 33 0 As Justice Powell remarked, the vitality of the representative

branches would erode if the Judiciary were to repeatedly utilize its power
to negate the actions of the other branches. 31
In conclusion, under principles of modern standing law, the Freedom court's decision recognizing the standing of taxpayers challenging
executive action should not be sustained. The Freedom decision's expansion of taxpayer standing conflicts with the constitutional requirement of
a concrete injury and upsets the balance of powers of government.
VII. THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH IS THE APPROPRIATE BRANCH
OF GOVERNMENT TO RESOLVE TAXPAYER GRIEVANCES

The Legislative Branch is well suited to respond to general taxpayer
grievances in part because the legislative function is inherently general
rather than particular.3 32 As Chief Justice Burger observed, "Congress
can initiate inquiry and action, define issues and objectives, and exercise
virtually unlimited power by way of hearings and reports, thus making a
record for plenary consideration and solutions. 333 Whereas the staffing
of a federal judge's chambers is relatively thin, the machinery of con-

327. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992).

328. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell explained that were the non-representative Judiciary to oversee the elected branches by
entertaining taxpayer and citizen suits, that use of power would contradict our democratic form of
government. Id.
329. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972).
330. Richardson,418 U.S. at 179.
331. Id. at 188 (Powell, J., concurring).
332. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221 n.10 (1974).
333 Id
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gressional oversight is enormous.334 Indeed, the Appropriations Committee in each House has more than a dozen subcommittees, each of which
may hold hearings and question agency officials about agency activities,
policies, and procedures. 335 "Hearings may include testimony from
members of the public about how agency action has affected them and
nongovernmental experts on the consequences of government
also from
336
policy.
In addition, Congress has created the Governmental Accountability
Office (GAO) for the purpose of overseeing the activities of the Executive Branch.337 That institution employs nearly 3,300 people and has a
budget of over $460 million. 338 The GAO's primary responsibilities
include studying how the federal government spends taxpayer dollars,
auditing federal expenditures, and reporting its findings to Congress.339
Thus, through its own oversight activities and those of the GAO, Congress has ample means of overseeing the spending activities of the
Executive Branch.
The argument that the Judiciary should allow unrestricted taxpayer
and citizen suits essentially underestimates the ability of the representative branches of federal government.340 It also ignores the fact that taxpayer or citizen advocacy has a potentially broad base. 34 1 Taxpayers as a
class have the type of leverage that can effectively command the attention of the branches that were intended to be responsive to general public
grievances.342 In contrast, the success of a taxpayer suit is dependent
upon the resources and skill of a particular plaintiff or set of plaintiffs.343
Furthermore, through its power of the purse, the Legislative Branch
is uniquely suited to resolve matters of executive spending. As noted by

334. Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 124 (2006)

("The machinery of congressional oversight is enormous.").
335. Id.
336. Id.at 125.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

Id. at 127-28.
Id.at 128-29.
Id.
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188-89 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 189.
Id.
Id.at 190-91.

[S]ince the Judiciary cannot select the taxpayers or citizens who bring suit or the nature
of the suits, the allowance of public actions would produce uneven and sporadic review,
the quality of which would be influenced by the resources and skill of the particular

plaintiff. And issues would be presented in abstract form, contrary to the Court's recognition that "judicial review is effective largely because it is not available simply at the behest of a partisan faction, but is exercised only to remedy a particular, concrete injury."
Id.(quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740-41 n.16 (1972)).
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James Madison, "[t]his power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as
the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can
arm the immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress
of every grievance,
and for carrying into effect every just and salutary
344
measure."
The power of the purse is articulated in the Appropriations
Clause,34 5 which provides that "[n]o Money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law. 346 The
Appropriations Clause has been described as "the
most important single
347
curb in the Constitution on Presidential power.,
Through the Appropriations Clause, Congress has a number of
ways to control executive spending action. First, it may appropriate more
money for programs it favors and less (or no funds) for disfavored programs. 348 Second, it may use appropriations riders to prohibit the expenditure of funds for particular executive programs. 349 For example, for
several years during President Clinton's presidency, Congress prevented
OSHA from spending funds for the issuance of ergonomics regulations. 350 Additionally, in the 1980s, Congress forbade the Federal Communications Commission from spending funds to reexamine or reverse
broadcast licensing preferences for women and minorities. 35 1 Indeed,
through the use of appropriation riders, Congress could prohibit the various agency departments from spending funds in support of the FBCI,
insofar as it violates the Establishment Clause. Third, it may "earmark"
funds for a very particular purpose or program. 352 Finally, under the
Account and Statement Clause, Congress has "plenary power to spell out
the details of precisely when and with what specificity Executive agen-

344. THE FEDERALIST No. 58 (James Madison).

345. Paul E. Salamanca, The Constitutionalityof an Executive Spending Plan, 92 KY. L.J. 149,
163 (2003).
346. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 7.
347. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW 1-3, n.2
(2d ed. 1991) (quoting EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 134

(H.W. Chase & C.R. Ducat 14th ed. 1978)); see also Stith, supra note 299, at 1344 ("[T]he power of
the purse in Congress... is at the foundation of our constitutional order."). Indeed, James Madison
noted in the House of Representatives that "appropriations of money [are] of a high and sacred character; [they are] the great bulwark which our Constitution [has] carefully and jealously established
against Executive usurpations." Salamanca, supra note 345, at 163 (citation and quotation marks
omitted).
348. See Beermann, supra note 334, at 84-85.
349. Id. at 85 ("Congress has used what are known as appropriation riders to supervise the
execution of the laws in a very direct and particularized way.").
350. Id. at 85-86.
351. Id. at 86.
352. Id. at 89-90.
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cies must report the expenditure of appropriated funds. 3 53 Hence, the
Constitution empowers the Legislative Branch with several means to
remedy a taxpayer's grievance concerning the Executive Branch's allocation of federal funds. Because the Legislative Branch is armed with the
necessary oversight machinery and fiscal power to address taxpayer
grievances, federal court jurisdiction is unnecessary.
Notably, in Freedom, the court of appeals held that standing was
appropriate under a line of Supreme Court decisions rendered in the
1990s upholding the standing of plaintiffs who challenged some aspect
of the federal election process. 354 However, in each of those cases, federal court jurisdiction was perhaps a necessary response to abuses of the
political system so pervasive as to undermine democratic processes.355 In
contrast, federal court jurisdiction is not a necessary response in cases
challenging executive spending abuses. Unlike the cases cited by the
Freedom court, taxpayer suits do not implicate the federal election process and thus do not undermine democratic processes. In taxpayer cases
challenging executive spending abuses, the Legislative Branch is the appropriate branch of government to respond to the concerns.
Finally, the Legislative Branch's resolution of taxpayer grievances
involving the soundness of executive policies is consistent with our democratic form of government. The Constitution allocates policy-making
authority to the representative branches of government, not the unrepresentative federal Judiciary. That allocation of power is reflected in the
following passage written by Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist
Papers:
The Executive not only dispenses the honours, but holds the sword
of the community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but
prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen
are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence
over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength
or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution
whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL,

353. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 178 n.l I (1974).
354. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989, 990 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing
Dep't of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 331 (1999) (voter
standing to challenge the use of statistical sampling for census); FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20-25
(1998) (standing to sue for lists of donors to political action committees); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S.
952, 958 (1996) (plurality opinion) (voter standing to challenge newly-created congressional districts
as racially gerrymandered).
355. See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 195 n.17 (Powell, J., concurring) ("Baker v. Carr may have a
special claim to sui generis status. It was perhaps a necessary response to the manifest distortion of
democratic principles practiced by malapportioned legislatures and to abuses of the political system
so pervasive as to undermine democratic processes.").
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but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon356the aid of
the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.
For the foregoing reasons, the Legislative Branch, through its general oversight authority and its power of the purse, is the proper branch
of government to address taxpayer grievances concerning the Executive
Branch's allocation of the federal largesse.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit's recent decision in Freedom has paved a doctrinal crossroads for the Supreme Court. In holding that the plaintiffs
have standing as taxpayers under Article III to challenge the constitutionality of President Bush's FBCI program,35 7 the Freedom court has
presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to either abridge or
expand taxpayer standing doctrine. This Article has made the case for
abridgment. The concept of taxpayer standing upheld in Freedom is unsupported by, and contrary to, Supreme Court precedent. It falls outside
of the literal terms of the Flast paradigm and is irreconcilable with the
post-Flast taxpayer standing cases of Schlesinger, Valley Forge, and
Kendrick. Furthermore, taxpayer standing to challenge purely executive
action does not fit within any reasonable extension of the Flast nexus
paradigm. Finally, under modern standing doctrine, the Freedom plaintiffs are unsuitable parties to invoke federal court jurisdiction because
they have not suffered any concrete, actual, or imminent injury.
For these reasons, the Supreme Court would be well advised to stay
the Judiciary's hand in the kind of taxpayer grievance sought to be adjudicated in Freedom, thereby preventing any further perpetuation of the
doctrinal confusion introduced in Flast.358 In doing so, the Court need
not overrule Flast since the taxpayer grievance in Freedom falls outside
the ambit of that case; indeed, an attempt to do so would constitute mere
dicta. Rather, the Court's refusal to recognize standing should be
grounded in modem standing doctrine and the tenet of separation of
powers upon which the case-and-controversy requirement and standing
doctrine are based. Such a step toward uniform application of modem
standing law would bolster the public's confidence in both the integrity
of the Judiciary and the vitality of the representative branches of gov-

356. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
357. Freedom,433 F.3d at 996.
358. See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 180 (Powell, J., concurring).
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uses its power of selfeminent. The public is entitled to a Judiciary 3 that
59
definition fairly, consistently, and judiciously.

359. See Bems, supra note 5.

